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Sammendrag 
 
Å skape nye bedrifter er i kjernen av entreprenørskap. Dessverre møter unge selskap mange 
hindringer i de første stadiene av deres utvikling. ”Det finansielle gapet”, eller mangel på 
finansielle ressurser, er ansett som den viktigste av dem. Disse selskapene søker finansiering 
fra mange forkjellige kilder. Man tror at valget mellom dem kan påvirke deres påfølgende 
ytelse. Jeg utforsker dette temaet gjennom å studere den innhentede eksterne kapitalen og den 
påfølgende ytelsen til 72 norske akademiske ”spin-offs”, deltakere av FORNY1-programmet. 
Resultatene mine indikerer klart at ekstern egenkapitalfinansiering øker sjansene for 
overlevelse mens gjeldsfinansiering minker sjansen for overlevelse. Disse funnene støtter ikke 
den tradisjonelle ”pecking order” teorien av Myers and Majluf (1984) men heller ”reverse 
pecking order” teorien av Garmaise (2001). Tilstedeværelsen av venture capital både som 
aksjonærer og styremedlemmer fører til signifikant salgsvekst i organisasjonene, noe som er 
diskutert i forhold til prinsipal-agent teori av Eisenhardt (1989). 
Forskningens begrensninger og forslag for videre studier er fremhevet. 
 
                                                
1
 Forskningsbasert nyskaping; see www.forskningsradet.no  
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Abstract 
 
Creating new ventures lies in the foundations of entrepreneurship. However, young firms are 
known to face many constraints during their early stages of development and formation.  
“Financial gap”, or the lack of the financing resources, is considered to be the most important 
of them. These firms seek financing from different sources. It is believed that the choice 
between them can influence the subsequent performance of the organizations. I am exploring 
this issue by investigating the external financing attracted and the further performance of the 
72 Norwegian academic spin-offs, participants of the FORNY program. The results clearly 
indicate that external equity financing increases the chance of survival while debt financing 
decreases it. These findings do not support the traditional pecking order theory of Myers and 
Majluf (1984) but rather the reverse pecking order of Garmaise (2001). The presence of  
venture capital (VC) as shareholders and on the board of directors significantly helps the 
organizations to grow sales-wise, something which is discussed in light of agency theory of 
Eisenhardt (1989). 
Limitations, implications and propositions for future research are highlighted. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Omnia mutantur, nihil interit  
(Everything changes, nothing perishes)  
Ovid  
 
Entrepreneurship relies on the foundation of new ventures. Growth of entrepreneurial 
ventures creates wealth of the country’s economy (Robinson and Phillips McDougall, 2001). 
However, the way to become successful and create economic wealth lies through overcoming 
the difficulties and obstacles for the new firms. One of the main constraints named in the 
literature is shortage of funds that limits the development of the firm (Wright et al., 2006, 
Pazos et al., 2010, Knockaert et al., 2009) while profits remain low in the early stages of their 
development (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). This “financial gap” turns the firms to seek the 
external funding. Difference in the forms and amount of the attracted financing is believed to 
affect the subsequent performance of the new ventures (Shane and Stuart, 2002). This work’s 
aim is to investigate this statement utilizing as an example special type of new ventures – 
academic spin-offs (ASOs).  
The choice fell on them; due to these firms are new ventures that represent the modern way of 
thinking how technology can be transferred from academia to business quite rapidly and start 
working for economy and social sphere by developing growth in industries (Zahra et al., 
2007, Pazos et al., 2010) Researchers in this field like Ferrary and Granovetter (2009) 
confirm that academic spin-offs (ASOs) are also usually constrained in their internal sources 
and therefore the external funding is often sought to fill the “financial gap”. The recent 
research on ASOs in Norway revealed that performance of these firms is low and they “seem 
to fail to attract capital in the growth phase” (Borlaug et al., 2009) Therefore it appears 
natural to explore the impacts of the external capital sources on the performance of the 
company in these firms’ context. 
One of the reasons that lead to “financial gap” is due to the owners/inventors of ASOs often 
possess less knowledge about optimal financing (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). Heirman and 
Clarysse (2004) support this by reporting that 42% of firms start as prospectors and have no 
clear plans on their business aim and strategy, something which entails that their founders 
might not have a solid aim of how to grow. This can turn that the financing sought is not 
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appropriate for the firm or is achieved on the higher cost than expected or is not obtained at 
all. To add, young ASOs, among other weaknesses, also lack managerial skills, have limited 
or no record history, usually no market-ready product to offer (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). 
These and other reasons make it difficult for the professional investors to obtain correct 
information on the opportunity and reliability of the statements and proposals of the founders’ 
projects. Decision to seek the external finance and the type of obtaining thereof is often 
related to the information asymmetries (Figure 1 below) and its’ constrains (Cosh et al., 2009, 
Sørheim, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 1 – Information asymmetry and financial gap adopted from (Sørheim, 2003, p.5) 
 
Myers and Majluf (1984) revealed that entrepreneurs often have intimate information that 
investors do not possess, which makes it difficult to negotiate and reach a consensus about 
external financing for both sides. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) obtaining external 
equity capital, diluting the ownership share can be an indication of a low quality firm, if there 
exists unused debt capacity. In fact, this research direction, named pecking order theory, 
predicts that firm’s priority of investments in new projects will follow a special order. 
Namely, first, internal cash flows will be used, therefore, if necessary external debt will be 
sought, and only as a last possibility an external equity capital. By extension, the pecking 
order theory predicts that the use of external capital will have a negative influence on firm 
performance, such as survival and growth. 
On the other hand Garmaise’s (2001) findings revealed that external equity finance can 
indicate a high quality firm, if the investors have the higher ability to recognize the projects 
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quality compared to the entrepreneurial firm managers/owners. Mueller, Westhead et al. 
(2012), referring to Colombo and Grilli (2005) confirmed this finding in the question of 
venture capital (VC) investment and claims that it can stimulate the growth of ASO. In 
comparison with the traditional pecking order theory, the reverse pecking order theory 
suggests that the use of external equity capital will have a positive influence on firm 
performance, such as the survival and growth. 
The question of the investor’s contribution to the business, by not only choosing the best 
investees, but also assisting in the business development has been discussed broadly in the 
literature of spin-offs (Cosh et al., 2009, Clarysse et al., 2007a, Bertoni et al., 2011). This can 
be tied to agency theory, and how venture capitalists acting as principals seek to minimize 
risks and moral hazards by gaining tighter control over the organizations (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
However Cosh, Cumming et al. (2009) admits that there is a lack and large segmentation of 
studies that compare different types of external investors in their abilities to recognize the 
goodness of the idea and overcome information asymmetries. Importance of various capital 
sources to the entrepreneurial firms and subsequent performance is also under-investigated. 
  
1.1 Research relevance 
 
The researchers have tried to approach this revealed problem. In spite of studies have tried to 
link financing challenges with performance, there are, however still gaps in this field of study. 
The whole research field is named “young”, presenting the studies that are based on different 
theories and sources, few analyzing same processes or utilizing comparable data (Rasmussen 
et al., 2012). 
The literature seems to be divided into two streams: one trying to capture and investigate what 
conditions and factors the ASOs should possess to be able to obtain the external financing and 
another flow inquires the relations between the investors and ASOs and their link to 
performance. Pazos and Lòpez (2010) claim that they “have not found any work which 
analyses the factors which lie behind their (ASOs) capital structure”. Cosh et al. (2009) also 
claims that entrepreneurial finance literature focuses usually on one external capital source, as 
information is often obtained from the particular investor making the funding picture very 
fragmented. The most commonly studied therefore is the relationship between science-based 
entrepreneurial firms (SBEF) and venture capitalists (Knockaert et al., 2009, Bertoni et al., 
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2011, Mueller et al., 2012). Munari and Toschi (2011) tried to reveal whether the last named 
have bias against investments in academic start-ups. Shane and Stuart (2002) concluded that 
venture funding is the most important determinant of the initial public offering (IPO) 
likelihood of the ASO. Bertoni, Colombo et al. (2011) concluded that VC investments have a 
significant influence on the growth of the ASOs. However Knockaert, Wright et al. (2009) 
claim that venture capital is improbable to help to overcome resource deficit or add value to 
SBEFs. Therefore I can conclude that my systematic literature investigation, presented in the 
next chapter, have not revealed any research on the establishment of the clear link between 
the differences in external funding and salient performance, though Shane and Stuart (2002) 
mentioned in their research that this variance has the place to be. Those studies that exist 
usually examine only one type of investors and as we can see on the example of the VC 
financing the findings are controversial. 
Nevertheless, performance of the new ventures is highly appreciated theme in the field of 
economic research (Zahra et al., 2007, Isaksen, 2006). Keeping in mind these issues and 
findings I formulated my research within following framework. This is a follow-up study of 
organizations- participants of the FORNY program, initiated by the government of Norway. 
All the participants were associated with Technology Transfer Offices (TTO). The main 
concern of the study is to examine the links between the external capital acquisition 
(success/failure to attract different types of thereof) and subsequent survival and growth 
in sales. Hopefully this will bring new approaches to the current research of ASOs’ 
performance, and shed light on whether traditional pecking order theory or reverse pecking 
order theory is supported among the FORNY-organizations.       
This research will adopt the relevant theories and their understanding of the entrepreneur’s 
behavior and funding choices in the context of financial gap and information asymmetries, 
and will give a broader understanding whether and to what extent ASOs follow the patterns 
predicted by the pecking order theory, and its reversed kind. Agency theory’s relevance will 
also be illustrated, when discussing venture capital’s role as a member of the board of 
directors and its subsequent effect on performance.  
One of the goals of this work is to extend the findings of the rapport on FORNY firms, that 
was aimed to evaluate the program (Borlaug et al., 2009) and contribute with additional 
knowledge on the existing literature. The decision in a follow-up study was among others 
made because on one hand the authors of the initial rapport were concerned of “generally 
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poor growth rate” of ASOs as well as on the other hand researchers often complain on the 
lack of systematic research in this field, fragmentation and inconsistency in findings and my 
investigation follows the development of the firms from the survey of 2008 until today 
(Zhang, 2009b, Rasmussen et al., 2012). Let this follow-up set the new traditions in the aim of 
getting a complete, holistic picture of the processes influencing the performance of the ASOs.   
After this brief introduction, the work proceeds as following: first, a framework where a 
literature review of my field of study, relevant theories and hypothesis  are presented; second, 
research methodology that includes data gathering and measures used in this research; thirdly, 
empirical analysis is presented and finally discussion chapter introduces the results, 
limitations and implications for future research. 
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2 FRAMEWORK 
 
In this study university spin-off (USO), academic spin-off (ASO) and start-ups and science-
based new firms (SBEF) are to be understood as synonyms. All of the firms to be studied 
were started under the FORNY program and therefore can be considered as a homogenous 
group in this aspect. Their characteristic features are: 1) aim – they were founded to 
commercialize the results from publicly funded research institutions 2) are related to one of 
the Technology Transfer Offices (TTO) that Norwegian government is cooperating with 
(NFR-2, 2011). 
These TTOs in their turn have a network and connections with Universities, University 
Colleges, business actors and others. FORNY program points on the same problems that 
mainstream research is claiming: difficulties in obtaining the sufficient financing in early 
stages of USOs. To minimize this gap FORNY is holding verification to ensure the private 
and public actors to invest in a project.  Patenting and licensing can be results of this 
verification (NFR-2, 2011). 
 
2.1 Literature review  
 
Haurit aquam  cribro, qui discere vult sine libro 
(The person who wants to learn without a book  is gathering  water in a sieve) 
 
To reveal whether there is a link between differences in the external financing and subsequent 
performance I have got a clear plan of actions to obtain and examine/study the relevant 
literature in this field. To my knowledge the most recent review of the performance of the 
new technology based firms is written by Rasmussen et al. (2012) where I have been one of 
the co-authors. This literature study was based on a data available from the ISI Web of 
Knowledge database and contains the relevant literature from year 1995 until 2011. During 
the writing time of that rapport I have been in the research team throughout the whole process. 
This entails that I have acquired the competency needed in order to know whether or not 
acquired article collection is saturated, i.e. whether or not I have acquired all relevant 
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literature. Included in these skills are the knowledge of proper word combinations, how to use 
Boolean operators, how to exclude improper terms, and of course manual filtering through the 
EndNote citation manager. Carrying this baggage of knowledge I decided to complete the 
literature that is revealed by the above named rapport/literature review and use the Scopus 
database to cross check the findings and add relevant articles that were not in the initial 
rapport but are nevertheless important for my study. Scopus is a credible data source, 
covering a large amount of acknowledged journals. In addition it supports bulk exporting of 
abstract and citations for EndNote, making it easier, and more practical to use when working 
with large amounts of articles. 
First of all, specific word combinations were chosen to cover my field of study. There is a 
variety of terms used for technology commercialization in academia, and I have covered the 
ones most used. Such words as: spin-offs, spin-outs,. science-based entrepreneurial firms and 
start-ups were utilized. To reduce the quantity of results on the word “start-ups” words 
“academic” and “university” were used to limit my search hits. All findings were exported to 
EndNote and duplicates were removed. Table  1 presents my findings. 
 
Table  1 – Word combinations used while searching the Scopus database per 13.02.2012. 
(capital or 
“VC”) 
(“academic spin-offs” OR “academic start-ups” 
OR “academic spin-outs”) 
AND (performance 
OR growth) 
117 
(capital or 
“VC”) 
(“university spin-offs” OR “university spin-outs” 
OR “university start-ups”) 
AND (performance 
OR growth) 
288 
(capital or 
“VC”) 
(“research-based start-ups” OR “research-based 
spin-offs” OR “research-based firms” OR 
“research-based spin-outs”) 
AND (performance 
OR growth) 
78 
(capital or 
“VC”) 
(“science-based entrepreneurial firms” OR 
“SBEF”) 
AND (performance 
OR growth) 
210 
 
An example from the table above would be: (capital OR “VC”) AND (“academic spin-offs” 
OR “academic start-ups” OR “academic spin-outs”) AND (performance OR growth). This 
method of search gave me the possibility to add the articles which had at one time either word 
capital or VC and performance or growth and one of the names that ASO are usually called. 
The total sum of unique articles after deleting duplicates was 514. I then checked my EndNote 
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database with the previous mentioned literature review of Rasmussen et al. (2012) and 
following literature reviews (Table  2): 
 
Table  2 – Literature reviews on the ASOs. 
Agrawal, 
(2001) 
“University-to-industry knowledge transfer: Literature review and 
unanswered questions.”  
Djokovic and 
Souitaris,(2008) 
“Spinouts from academic institutions: A literature review with suggestions 
for further research.”  
Mustar et 
al.(2006) 
“Conceptualizing the heterogeneity of research-based spin-offs: A multi-
dimensional taxonomy.”  
Rothaermel et 
al. (2007) 
“University entrepreneurship: A taxonomy of the literature.”  
 
After these manipulations and careful reading of each abstract in EndNote I ended up with 
around 60 relevant articles.  These have been printed out and studied to get the sense what 
drives the modern research in this area. Reference lists have been also studied and new works 
added. However the master thesis is very limited in the writing time and therefore the 
literature review has been reduced to around 35-40 articles, and some of them do not study 
ASO but have an important implication to the choice of measurements, econometric analysis 
and theoretical footing. These are for example the studies of corporate spin-offs and small and 
medium firms. The need to adopt these studies comes from the above mentioned argument in 
the introduction chapter: the research in this field of study is quite “young” and is still 
fragmented (Rasmussen et al., 2012).  
To sum up I should admit that such a detailed study of the literature has given me an 
opportunity to explore the available knowledge on ASOs from different sides. This includes 
their startup conditions, development, performance and impacts. On the other hand I got a 
deep knowledge about funding differences and how different authors interpret them to 
influence the performance of NTBFs. And at last the “performance” is measured differently 
from author to author. This was more time consuming but bearing in mind my earlier 
knowledge obtained from the previous project, strong interest for this theme and an additional 
literature research, I claim to have got a holistic picture of the phenomena studied that gives 
me an advantage and strength to perform the analysis further in this paper.  
 FRAMEWORK  
 
 
9 
 
To save the space and the thread of my narrative I will not write a long conclusion on the 
literature derived. Some of the important articles that I have revealed during my literature 
review are coded and presented in the appendix section (see appendix 1 literature review). 
Below I have summarized my findings in a manner that is pertinent for my topic. 
The research of the performance of the new ventures is a favorable theme in the field of 
entrepreneurship (Isaksen, 2006). Most of the studies in my literature review are quantitative. 
I could not detect any prevailing theory, rather a mix of them. It can be partly explained to the 
above mentioned claims of the “youth” of the field of study of the ASOs (Rasmussen et al., 
2012). However one mainstream has been detected. Many of the presented studies indicate the 
presence of information asymmetries between the owners/founders of ASOs and potential 
investors (e.g. (Shane and Stuart, 2002, Vanacker and Manigart, 2010, Mueller et al., 2012, 
Bonardo et al., 2011, Cosh et al., 2009, Wright et al., 2006, Knockaert et al., 2009) which can 
worsen the “financial gap”. While these authors have e.g., sought to offer an insight in how 
ASOs make decisions on what kinds of financing they prefer, how they internally assemble 
resource bases that signal credibility in order to attract venture capital, how non-financial 
capital can affect signaling towards debtors, and how information asymmetries’ makes 
valuation of firms difficult, none have sought any link between the type of external financial 
capital attracted and its subsequent effects on performance. This is in spite of the 
acknowledgement that “access to financing is a key determinant of growth in any new 
technology-based firm” (Bonardo et al., 2011:758). 
A number of works tries to understand how to overcome information asymmetries and get 
access/attract to the external investors (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005, Mueller et al., 2012, 
Knockaert et al., 2009, Munari and Toschi, 2011). However the subsequent performance, 
after the financing is achieved or not has not got the same attention. There are though, some 
authors who have tried to concentrate on individual external sources meaning that they have a 
superior/higher importance for the ASOs performance than others. The most often studied is 
the VC funding. The findings in this question however are controversial. One study claims 
that the attraction of VC is the only determinant of the successful IPO (Shane and Stuart, 
2002). While other authors conclude that only VC funding cannot resolve the problem of the 
resources lack or add value to the firm (Knockaert et al., 2009). Some authors rank this type 
of financing so high that along with such outcomes as IPO or failure they hypothesize the 
attraction of VC funding as well (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Variation in the performance 
measurements also leads to think that the researchers are trying to adopt the well known 
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measurements to this field that however is not always bringing the desirable results. For 
example profitability is named to be insufficient indicator due to the most of the ASOs make 
no or low profits in the young stages of development, due to they start without a clear product 
to introduce to the market (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). Clarysse et al. (2011) supports this 
saying that traditional accounting measurements are not suitable for these firms. Among those 
measures/ indicators that are often used are survival/success and failure and growth, 
particularly growth in sales and employment (e.g. (Wennberg et al., 2011, Zhang, 2009b, 
Nerkar and Shane, 2003, Bonardo et al., 2011, Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005, Clarysse et al., 
2011, Vanacker and Manigart, 2010, Cosh et al., 2009, Robinson and Phillips McDougall, 
2001, Evans, 1987, Davidsson et al., 2006). However in their studies of survival and growth 
authors turn to human capital and technology determinants. The investigation of the existence 
of previous relationships, education level and years of experience in industry as well as 
radicalness of technology are used among others to explain the performance (Colombo et al., 
2010) (O'Shea et al., 2005, Shane and Stuart, 2002, Mueller et al., 2012, Nerkar and Shane, 
2003).  
The lack of studies of how external capital can affect performance can be blamed on the youth 
of the ASOs phenomena, that the firms are unquoted and that their aim in developing a new 
technology is bearing high risks for potential investors and therefore the usual ways of 
accumulating and attracting the funding may not be appropriate or available (Vanacker and 
Manigart, 2010). This makes it even more challenging to investigate how these firms act 
through the time while some succeed in attracting debt capital and some equity capital or 
both. Does the presence of external capital speed the growth or vice versa?  
All the literature is used throughout this work in each chapter, with special attention given to 
the formulation of hypothesis, use of theories, models, variables and conclusions. Therefore in 
the next section I combine the findings in my field of study from the literature as well as 
derive my hypothesis.  
 
2.1.1 Funding needs and availability in different stages of USOs 
 
ASOs need funding through a long period of time from start-up until they are bought by an 
industry, started production or have in another way moved from the “commercializing 
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research” phase. Roger Sørheim (2003) in his doctoral thesis gives a very informative 
illustration of finance sources, usually obtained by entrepreneurial firms in different stages of 
their development. This is illustrated in Figure 2, p. 11. 
 
 
Figure 2 – Entrepreneurial firm’s life cycle and appropriate financing sources (Sørheim, 
2003:3) 
 
As well as Neff has an informative figure of the general availability and ways of funding of  
start-ups presented bellow in Figure 3, p. 12. 
Both figures have a common pattern. Young start-ups are first of all relying on the internal 
financing and help of friends and family at the start-up phase. Next step, according to figures 
is an achievement of equity financing with the help of angels, venture capitalists and others. 
Angels financing is usually insufficient and non-professional, while VC funding can help the 
USO to develop for IPO or trade sale  (Wright et al., 2006). 
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Figure 3 – The financial growth cycle. Obtained from Neff (2003:108) 
Young firms according to Neff are unlikely to get bank loan due to lack of reputation and 
track records, though they can have promising innovative ideas and lack of self-funding. She 
also stresses that equity funding was not an interesting area of study before 1990s, though this 
pattern is rapidly changing (Neff, 2003). Wright, Lockett et al. (2006) have come to the similar 
conclusion, referring to Lockett, they claim that venture capitalists and business angels tend to 
invest in early stages of firms cycle rather than traditional finance institutions (banks), 
meaning that the stage of investment has a lower risk factor than technology for them. They 
also discuss information asymmetries in earlier stages and their influence on VC funding 
(Wright et al., 2006). New times dictate updated approaches and visual angle of the 
phenomena (Wright et al., 2006).  Sørheim’s (2003)  and Neff’s (2003) research (as illustrated 
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in figure 2 and 3), shows that the predominant order of financing follows a reversed pecking 
order, preferring private external equity capital ahead of debt capital. In my work I will study 
whether or not these preferential of financing is beneficial to performance. 
 
2.2 Theoretical approaches 
 
The Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem of firm’s capital structure was proposed by Franco 
Modigliani and Merton Miller (1958,1963). Since then many authors have tried to develop 
their theories of optimum capital structure (Copeland and Weston, 2005, Pazos et al., 2010).    
Modern literature has revealed that MM assumptions are not met in market economy. The 
existence of agency costs, bankruptcy expenses and differences in the acquisition of external 
debt and equity both in risk and costs turned the researchers into this field of study and 
resulted in the development of new theories (Copeland and Weston, 2005). After completing 
the literature review the following theories were chosen for this work: pecking order theory, 
reversed pecking order theory and agency theory; and are presented below.  
 
2.2.1 Pecking order theory, and its reversed version 
 
According to Brealey et al. pecking order theory relies on information asymmetries.  This 
information “affects the choice between internal and external financing and between new 
issues of debt and equity securities” (Brealey et al., 2011:460). Herein lies the pecking order; 
the idea that internal capital is spent before external funds if the investments are needed. One 
of the most important reasons is that managers want to keep control from being diluted (Neff, 
2003). Another reason is that issuing debt requires less convincing of external finances than 
issuing equity.  This is because the risk for the creditor is lower than for a shareholder in case 
of liquidation.  
Since the manager has a better understanding of internal affairs in her organization she is in a 
better position to understand this risk of deploying this capital. While she might know that 
this capital will be used for growth instead of survival, this is something that investors cannot 
be sure of. Thus, debt is preferred over equity as equity holders lack the information that 
managers have (Brealey et al., 2011). The same goes for issues with bank: a creditor has less 
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information than entrepreneur, but has initially lower risk than the equity holders, because in a 
liquidation process they are preferred over them. This is the pecking order in which internal 
funds are primarily preferred second to debt and finally to new issues of equity (Brealey et al., 
2011). 
This leads to a circularity where potential investors who see skeptically on issues of equity 
because they believe that the firms debt capacity has been exceeded, which in its turn can 
point to a financial distress. This is because highly profitable firms are better able to finance 
their own growth and expansion.  
However some precaution should be taken with the use of this theory for my work, due to 
some authors came to a conclusion that pecking order theory does not reflect all the stages of 
firms development and is little informative in the context of small firms (Neff, 2003). 
Traditional pecking order theory indicates that acquiring external equity capital ahead of debt 
capital is not beneficial, as it increases information asymmetry and dilution. This can indicate 
that the firm is of low quality, as it is not able to grow enough to sustain itself without inviting 
help from external owners. 
As we have seen the pecking order of capital structure limits information asymmetries, but 
that does not mean that it is necessarily good for the performance of young spin-offs. External 
capital can bring positive effects with their entry into the firm (e.g., professional management, 
contact networks, or signaling of quality) (Garmaise, 2001). If this is the case, pecking order 
theory might in fact be reversed when using it as a predictor for future performance – having 
greater amount of external capital, and not relying on debt can be a sign of quality. Some 
researchers have explored this avenue, among others Garmaise (2001) and Cosh et al. (2009) 
They have found that in the context of ASOs, the pecking order appears to be reversed. This 
reversed pecking order entails that taking external capital on board has a higher saliency than 
debt. Even internal funds can have a lower priority than attracting some forms of external 
capital, according to Wright et al. (2006). In this case, the external capital, and possible added 
value that comes with it, surpasses the drawbacks of information asymmetries. This will be 
tested in hypothesis H1, and H2, where I will see whether or not increased levels of debt and 
equity, affects non-financial and financial performance.  
Garmaise (2001) claims that the empirical evidence shows that external capital have 
experience and information that “enable them better to judge entrepreneurial ventures than 
the entrepreneurs themselves” (Garmaise, 2001:2). His argument is that this makes the 
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reversed pecking order more sensible for smaller firms seeking growth, while the ordinary 
pecking order is more adapted to firms of larger size. This entails that for these firms investors 
may have more information than the owners themselves. 
In the next section, agency theory, it will be shown that venture capitalists have several 
instruments by which they can reduce risk and ensure control from an equity holder stand-
point, making the gap between internal funding and venture equity smaller in the pecking 
order. 
 
2.2.2 Agency theory 
 
“Agency theory provides a unique, realistic, and empirically testable perspective on 
problems of cooperative effort.” (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
 
According to Eisenhardt’s claim 
above, agency theory might be 
considered to be an interesting choice 
for a theoretical framework in my 
paper. Below agency theory will be 
presented, and tied to my study to 
show why I believe Eisenhardt were 
right. I am not the first in employing 
agency theory in studying how 
external equity capital affects 
performance, as can be seen from my 
literature review. In their studies, 
agency theory gave consistent results, 
something that my study will benefit 
from. For a general overview of the 
theory, Table  3 to the right might be 
of help. 
Central to agency theory is the idea of 
Table  3 – Overview of agency theory from  
Eisenhardt (1989) 
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the principal and agent and the contract governing this relationship (Eisenhardt, 1989). A 
principal in this context can be seen as the owner of some resources, such as financial capital, 
while the agent is the steward
2
 of these resources. In this relationship we assume that the 
agent is self-seeking, and knows more about the everyday affairs of the organization than 
those owning it (Eisenhardt, 1989). A contract on the other hand is in this context not 
necessarily a piece of paper with conditions about what is allowed and disallowed in the 
relationship between principle and agent, but rather a metaphorical construct that can take 
form as a legally binding document (Eisenhardt, 1989, Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
contract (or agreement) is needed because there is asymmetric information between the agent 
and principal, and so the principal needs to ensure that the agent follows his wishes 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In our case, this is most likely done through a legal contract when, most 
often studied, the venture capital funds come into our companies as owners. 
According to Eisenhardt (1989 :58), “agency theory is concerned with resolving two 
problems that can occur in agency relationships. The first is the agency problem that arises 
when (a) the desires or goals of the principal and agent conflict, and (b) it is difficult or 
expensive for the principal to verify what the agent is actually doing ... The second problem is 
of risk sharing that arises when the principal and agent have different attitudes toward risk.” 
(emphasis by the author) 
As for the first challenge, the agency problem, there can be many different reasons for both 
conflicting interests and goals between venture capitalists and academic spin-offs. Research 
has shown (Fini et al., 2009, Meyer, 2003) that many founders of academic spin-offs are more 
interested in developing their own academic skills and products, than actually growing the 
company and becoming financially successful. This is an example of moral hazard 
(Eisenhardt, 1989), or a lack of interest in doing what the principle wants.  Incentive systems 
would in theory be a good candidate to resolve this issue (Merchant and Van der Stede, 
2007), but there is the possibility that the founders themselves already have stock in the 
company, making options or stocks a weaker tool for aligning interests of the principal and 
agent. Also, the high degree of technological refinement in many of the concepts and products 
sold by the company makes it harder for the venture capitalists to verify what the founders are 
actually doing. This is an example of adverse selection (Eisenhardt, 1989). One solution for 
this problem would be to hire external managers, that are paid for by the investors themselves 
(Eisenhardt, 1989, Ortín-Ángel and Vendrell-Herrero, 2010). Again the high-tech nature of 
                                                
2
 Steward is here defined as a person who manages another's property or financial affairs 
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the product makes this a challenge. Here becoming part of the board of directors may be a 
more practical solution to the problem, as it gives both the power to change the strategic focus 
of the company, and with enough shares, a majority influence over major decisions. Other 
tools for solving this problem can be investing in more complex information channels, such as 
complex budget systems (Mellemvik et al., 1988, Eisenhardt, 1989). 
The second challenge, that of risk sharing (Eisenhardt, 1989), lies on the assumption that 
managers are more risk averse than the owners of the company. The background for this 
reasoning is that while the venture capitalists have a possibility to diversify their investments, 
this option is not as readily available for the managers of the company. In our case we can 
assume the managers of the company are often the founders themselves, and are therefore less 
risk averse than the average manager. They have, after all, started their own company, and is 
risking their academic career by placing publishing on hold, or at least slowing down their 
publishing rate. 
In this study, agency theory can be useful for understanding how investors asserts their rights 
as shareholders, and through this strives to ensure optimal financial performance. Coupled 
with pecking-order theory, this will give me good understanding of both the capital structure 
of the firm, as well as how the governance of these firms are upheld by the external 
shareholders, particularly venture capitalists. Since my sample has both academic spin-offs 
that have venture capital, and some that do not, I can analyze whether the lack of said capital 
is a characteristic that leads to worse performance. This is not to say that the capital itself is 
not the only influence external capital backing can have; managerial competency, networking 
effects, marketing and commercial capabilities and financial know-how can all be important 
factors determining the financial performance of these firms (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009, 
Ortín-Ángel and Vendrell-Herrero, 2010). 
The relevance of agency theory in my research is coupled with the possible value added that 
might come from external capital sources. The most typical of this kind is ASOs is when 
venture capital both invests in a company and at the same time takes a place on its board of 
directors. Through this channel they can provide networks and managerial competency among 
other factors (Garmaise, 2001). This link between agency theory and venture capital has been 
explored by a handful of authors (i.e., (Clarysse et al., 2007a, Knockaert et al., 2009, Pazos et 
al., 2010). While they have explored how venture capital can bring human capital to the board 
of directors, the link between performance and venture capital’s presence on the board 
remains underexplored. The venture capitalists may suffer from information asymmetries, and 
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the unwillingness of founders to give up controls (as explained by agency theory), but having 
them on-board might overcome this challenge as it reduces the asymmetries. In hypothesis 
H3, I will test whether or not they will be able to overcome these challenges, and provide 
added value to the firm in financial terms. 
 
2.2.3 Theoretical summary 
 
Below is a short summary of the theories employed in my research. Beneath the table below, I 
provide a more extensive discussion of their implications. 
 
Table  4 – Short summary of theories 
Theory Selection of capital preference Key features 
Pecking order 
theory 
Equity financing is preferred in 
the following order: 
- internal capital 
- debt 
- external equity capital 
 
Owners/founders have superior 
information that investors do not 
possess.  
The preference in the choice of financing 
is due to the unwillingness of paying 
extra fees (debt) and to share power with 
external (new) investors meaning that 
the original ones will lose some decision 
making strength  
Reversed 
pecking order 
theory 
Equity financing is preferred in 
the following order: 
- internal capital 
- external equity capital 
- debt 
Outside investors have greater expertise 
in projects’ quality evaluation than the 
entrepreneur/founder (Garmaise, 2001) 
This is the common pattern of financing 
for young firms. 
Agency theory 
- agency costs associated with 
external equity 
- optimal capital structure will 
have an amount of debt and 
external equity minimizing 
agency costs 
External shareholders have monitor costs 
used to assure that owners and managers 
are acting in their favor 
 
There is an inherent contradiction between pecking order theory (see Table  4 above), and the 
reversed pecking order. While the former prefer debt over capital due to information 
asymmetry, signaling effect, and dilution, the reversed pecking order admits the advantages 
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external capital can bring to new, small firms. Pecking order theory assumes that the 
entrepreneurs possess information that investors do not possess, while reverse pecking order 
assumes the opposite. If the reverse pecking order is more correct in describing the 
phenomenon, then the presence of external equity capital would lead to enhanced 
performance in the young entrepreneurial firms. 
Agency theory is useful for understanding the complex relationship between principals 
(investors) and agents (founders).  Employing this theory in my research helps me understand 
how information asymmetries and the problems associated with them, like moral hazard and 
adverse selection, but also the management competency and networks VC, can affect the 
performance of ASOs. 
 
2.3 Research question/ Hypothesis 
 
There were some drawbacks and limitations in my research that influenced the construction of 
the hypotheses. The most crucial is that the respondents did not specify what kind of external 
financing was tried to be obtained first and why. To compensate for this, broad information on 
the shareholders, as the amount of shares owned and time since these shares have been 
purchased is known, as well as data on what type of investors did issue debt to the company 
has been collected.  However the aim of this work was mainly to show the ability for 
independent work with data, theories and literature as well as performing the analysis and 
deriving conclusions from it and I think this task is achieved.  
For my study I am trying to define how the acquisition of external sources of financing has 
influenced the performance of the ASOs, measured in survival and growth in sales (the choice 
of dependent variables are thoroughly discussed in the next sub-chapter.) There is evidence 
that the early decisions of companies tend to persist for considerable period of time and 
develop a reputation for future (Shane and Stuart, 2002). I hypothesize on the possible 
outcomes, and use the literature and theories outlined to explain the relationship between the 
variables.  
ASOs start as a new firm often without any clear products to sell and are therefore constrained 
in resources generated internally (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). Even profitable ASOs can 
experience an under-investment problem and necessity of external financing can become 
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inevitable. Shane and Stuart (2002) claim that founders of USOs “vary in their ability to 
obtain the support of resource holders, and this variance likely has a salient effect on venture 
performance”. Surely there is a connection between the types of external founds attracted, 
their conditions of use/application and the subsequent performance of the firm. This part of 
the literature on USOs is highly fragmented giving a small amount of studies to refer. To 
support this, I will cite Vanacker and Manigart (2010), who refers to Eckhardt et al. (2006): 
“most studies in entrepreneurial finance have therefore focused on private equity  financing, 
ignoring other potentially important sources of financing such as retained earnings and debt 
financing” 
Therefore we can conclude that external resources can be achieved in form of external debt 
and equity capital and their subsequent effect on development of the firms can be different 
(Vanacker and Manigart, 2010, Neff, 2003). Young firms’ decision to seek external financing 
and type of it is often related to the information asymmetries faced by potential investors 
about the firms’ quality (Cosh et al., 2009). In USOs managers are often the owners, aimed to 
develop high-technological products and will avoid the entry of new shareholders due to the 
concerns of plagiarism, as well as the possibility to lose control over their company (dilution). 
According to agency theory, these owners will then prefer debt financing over equity, when 
the shortage of funds occurs in their profitable enterprise. This is motivated by the self-
preservation of managers’ power.  
Pecking order theory is also predicting that debt will be used first in this situation due to 
greater information asymmetries. USOs are small firms and lack of track history are subject of 
higher level of uncertainty though maybe higher growth opportunities at the cost of higher 
risk, and this will raise the cost of external funding. Therefore, conflict of interests between 
owners and creditors is one of the problems in USOs. As it was discussed before many ASOs 
start without clear perspectives on their business model (Heirman and Clarysse, 2004) and 
owners tend to be less committed to the growth of USOs due to their partial employment in 
the universities (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). Wright et al. (2006) refer to findings of  Keasey 
and Watson (1992) and Scherr et al. (1993) and say that most small businesses rely on debt 
capital rather than venture capital. Vanacker and Manigart (2010) also suggest that debt is the 
easiest and cheapest way of obtaining of outside financing. If USOs are following the pecking 
order, this is their choice in case of insufficient internal funding for the current projects.  Most 
often it is obtained in form of a bank debt and only interest is expected to be paid back, and no 
share of wealth creation is sought after/asked for in contradiction with external equity 
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shareholders. However increasing the leverage can lead to financial distress  (Vanacker and 
Manigart, 2010) and increase in moral hazard problems (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). 
Firms will carry a higher financial risk, giving less protection for debt investors, due to less 
amount of equity to rely on in case of liquidation. Vanacker and Manigart (2010) also remind 
us that banks are the firms “cash flow lenders”; building on the assumption that interest and 
debt will be paid back from the firms future cash flows. However the previous evidence and 
findings assume that USOs in early stages of development do not introduce the new product 
to market and therefore the proportion of firms making profits is actually low (Lindelöf and 
Löfsten, 2005). Adding to this the fact that USOs will often have inexperienced management 
teams that have a lack of knowledge related to financing needs (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005), I 
suggest that their decisions about the quantity and amount of debt capital can be mismatched 
with the real needs and possibilities of the firm to carry debt obligations.  
Additional external capital, on the other hand is not emphasizing moral hazard problem, not 
claiming for mortgage/collateral and therefore not increasing the failure. External equity 
funding is therefore seen as “assets lender” in contrast to debts “cash flow lender” (Vanacker 
and Manigart, 2010). Fama and French (2005) in their research revealed that over half of the 
small unprofitable high-growth ventures issue outside equity. However we discussed this 
issue, being unprofitable quite a long period after start-up is common for this type of firms, as 
technologies often need long-time exploratory development and funding (Lindelöf and 
Löfsten, 2005). Their revenues and profits are often hoped-for and lie in future (Shane and 
Stuart, 2002). Therefore the firms that have been granted external equity financing are 
thought to have overcome uncertainties and information asymmetries during their quality 
evaluation process (Shane and Stuart, 2002). 
Empirical findings of ASOs suggest that these firms actually follow a reversed pecking order 
in their decisions (Garmaise, 2001, Cosh et al., 2009, Wright et al., 2006). This entails that 
external equity is preferred before debt and in some cases even above internal earnings.   On 
the other hand some small business entrepreneurs may never consider attracting external debt 
and equity financing (Howorth, 2001). Those young firms, who are seeking for finance, 
surprisingly prefer external equity (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010, Garmaise, 2001). It is 
further claimed that for innovative entrepreneurial firms debt is “an unsuitable source of 
financing” (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010 :54) with referral to Gompers and Lemper (2001). 
Other researchers that have not used the pecking order theory as their theoretical basis, have 
also found there to be a reverse pecking order in place (Sørheim, 2003, Neff, 2003), but also 
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they deferred searching for any links between this often occurring pattern and performance. 
This link is the basis for my study. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 will test which of the two different variants (ordinary and reversed) of the 
pecking order theory of capital structure is supported (if any at all.) 
As discussed previously (and more deeply in the next subchapters) performance should be 
measured in both financial (e.g. growth in sales) and non-financial terms (e.g. survival.) 
Hypothesis 1 which is presented below relates to non-financial performance, and if the 
reversed pecking is correct in the context of ASOs it should be supported: 
H1a Additional financial debt increases the probability of failure in ASOs (ceteris 
paribus). 
H1b Additional external equity reduces the probability of failure in ASOs (ceteris 
paribus). 
While these hypotheses consider the linkage of whether or not following the reversed pecking 
order correlates with increased chances of survival, I also took financial performance into 
consideration and tested the following hypotheses as well:  
H2a Ceteris paribus, additional financial debt will lower the growth in sales of ASOs 
H2b Ceteris paribus, additional external equity will increase the growth in sales of 
ASOs. 
I could not ignore that the majority of the literature that is describing the influence of external 
capital on the performance of USOs is actually concerned about the presence of venture 
capital (VC) investors as shareholders or on the board of these organizations (Mueller et al., 
2012, Colombo and Grilli, 2005). Extensive research has been done and most authors 
conclude there is a strong positive relation between VC investment and the growth of a NTBF 
(Colombo and Grilli, 2005, Bertoni et al., 2011). Shane and Stuart (2002) even mentions the 
presence of VC investors in the firm is the major determinant for the firm to undergo the IPO. 
Not only the presence in and by itself seems to be important; also the form VC comes into the 
firm seems to be consequential Clarysse et al (2007a). Knockaert et al. (2009) found that 
having VC on the board of directors, can have a positive influence on performance of ASOs. 
However, according to Bertoni et al (2011) most of studies suffer from some weaknesses, 
among others that most of studies include only IPO firms and it is questionable whether these 
results can be generalized to privately held organizations. My study is addressing this issue. It 
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has been discussed that entrepreneurs attract VC for the unique features that are provided 
alongside the funding as possibility of firms to obtain lacking managerial skills and expand 
their networks (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009). VC on their side are carefully choosing the 
projects growing performance by examining not only financing features but also the 
“unobservable characteristics” like the innovation of the technologies, owner-managers team 
and others (Bertoni et al., 2011). These firms have another view on the firm’s quality and 
future development than debt lenders for example. 
To study and discuss whether or not venture capital’s presence affects financial performance 
in my sample, I will use agency theory, as it is well suited for exploring the effects that 
venture capital can bring with them when entering USOs (Clarysse et al., 2007a, Knockaert et 
al., 2009, Pazos et al., 2010). While this is the case, their studies primarily focused how the 
human capital affected the internals of the organization – little research has been done on how 
their presence on the board of directors can influence financial performance (which is 
ultimately VCs goal). This is something I will test by hypothesis 3: 
H3 Presence of VC on board and as shareholders increases ASOs’ growth in sales 
(ceteris paribus).  
As mentioned previously, I will below explain the choice of the performance measures chosen 
for this research. I have taken into account the common features of ASOs such as small, 
young, entrepreneurial forms with high risk, as well as their unique properties such as new 
technologies development, strong academic ties, etc. 
 
2.3.1 Performance  
 
As stated in hypotheses I want to explain the relationship between performance and financing 
decisions/acquisitions that influence on it.  
As declared before, researchers put a broad number of measures in this abbreviation. Such 
indicators in the studies about spin-offs can be: survival rate, growth, success, profitability of 
initial public offering and so on.  
In the hypothesis I presented survival and growth as indicators of non-financial and financial 
performance. Some of the studies that use both of the measures are Wennberg et al. (2011), 
Zhang (2009b), Evans (1987).  
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2.3.1.1 Survival 
 
Survival, chosen as one of the measures of performance, is quite used in the context of USOs 
and other newly started firms (Clarysse et al., 2011). The reason for this is that traditional 
accounting based measures may not always be appropriate for companies that have just 
recently been established. Here, other measures such as survival are more important in the 
first phase of the business’s life (Clarysse et al., 2011). Another reason for choosing survival 
together with growth, is that sometimes growth is not an objective for the companies by itself 
– trade sale or a successful IPO might be just as desirable. An example of this can be in the 
biotech industry: lengthy approval processes for new drugs as well as a large chance of doing 
a trade sale instead of undertaking one’s own production, makes profitability a possibly poor 
measure for performance (Zhang, 2009b, Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005, Shane and Stuart, 
2002). 
Many authors have contributed to the explanation of this phenomena/variable. Nerkar and 
Shane (2003) explored the effect of using of radical technologies by USOs; Zhang (2009a) 
and Buenstorf (2007) compared survival rates of USOs with other companies. Walter (2006) 
saw on the influence of network capability of the ASOs on their long-term survival.   
Survival is a good measure of performance for USOs due to their unique positioning and 
activity orientation (focus). Rasmussen et al. (2012) claims that studies included in their 
rapport suffer from survival biases, due to their survey only those organizations that have 
survived. Therefore, being a follow-up study this work will address this issue and concretize 
what have happened with the respondents of the initial survey in the past years taking into 
account both existing and non-existing respondents per today.  
 
2.3.1.2 Growth  
 
Performance measures calculated from the accounting data of young, unquoted new-
technology firms can be inappropriate to use. These companies often report losses in early 
stages of development (Shane and Stuart, 2002). Therefore this work will focus on growth in 
sales, in line with the recent works of Clarysse et al. (2011),  Lindelöf and Löfsten (2005), 
Evans (1987), Cosh et al. (2009), Robinson and Phillips McDougall (2001). Growth in sales 
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was the most frequently used performance indicator in over 30% of growth studies according 
to the investigation of Davidsson et al. (2006).  
According to Walter (2006) growth in sales shows “markets acceptance of a spin-off’s 
commercialized technologies”. Therefore they attribute the success of technology transfer to 
this measure. Clarysse et al. (2011 :11) come with a similar suggestions and add that these 
firms will turn profitable faster, “burn less cash”, and achieve IPO or a profitable trade sale.  
In my test I have included all firms that had available accounting data for year 2010, without 
removing the firms that did not survive until 2012. This helps to eliminate survival bias and 
increases the power of the models (Mueller et al., 2012). 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
“figures will not lie” …but “liars will  figure”. It is our duty, as practical  statisticians, to 
prevent the liar from  figuring; in other words, to prevent him from perverting 
 the truth, in the interest of some theory he wishes to establish.  
(Michigan Legislature, 1889 :311) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In quantitative analysis all steps and stages of research need to be performed correctly. This 
includes data gathering: sampling, choosing the way to contact the study object, data 
interpreting and coding, choosing right methods of analyzing it, building up models and 
constructs, and deriving conclusions. Each step is of crucial significance and therefore a 
straight plan of actions is needed (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). Below are presented the 
assumptions about data and variables that will be further used in the testing models. 
 
3.2 Ontology and epistemology 
 
My study is in the field of social science while my research question is formulated in a form 
of hypothesis that are to be tested, a large number of data and numbers is therefore been used. 
The research to be performed is of quantitative nature, to say more explanatory – hypothetic –
deductive and is closer to positivists view on the world and science. Therefore ontological 
position of this study is representationalism - finding of truth requires verification of 
predictions and research results should reflect accurately the reality (Easterby-Smith et al., 
2008). My role as a researcher will be in observing and collecting data without interfering 
with the object studied, so that ”facts can speak for themselves”.  
However some participation is inevitable: the questionnaire is made by a researcher; some 
interviews were conducted to clarify the answers, analysis and conclusions are performed and 
found by her, so I cannot make the presupposition that my work is founded on a theory 
neutral observational language (Johnson and Duberley, 2004). This excludes me from naïve 
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positivism, but my research is definitely of a positivistic nature, something which is common 
in the field of finance.  
I am not claiming that my findings are telling the absolute truth; my research will either 
strengthen or weaken my hypothesis, in line with Popper’s ideas of falsification. While 
Poppers ideas of critical rationalism can to some be argued as a removal from positivism, I 
argue that it is merely an evolution of the principle of verification towards a principle of 
refutation of imperfect views of truth (Johnson and Duberley, 2004). 
 
3.3 Design 
 
My study is quantitative, that means that systematic process of utilizing numerical data will be 
used to obtain information about the world, in other words casual relationships between the 
events (Cormack, 2000). 
As mentioned above, approach is hypothetic deductive - hypothesis is derived and needs to be 
tested in the real world. Pay attention to that I am not trying to say that my findings are truth 
in itself, I am merely trying to strengthen or falsify my hypothesis in line with Popper’s 
falsification principle  (Johnson and Duberley, 2004). Following, there are two events in my 
hypothesis: first is the presence or absence of external debt or equity financing and second is 
firm’s survival and growth. I am trying to model this condition and find if there is relationship 
between these events with the help of econometric methods. The level of analysis is 
organization. I am studying academic spin-offs.  
Now it is logical to present data sampling and collection first before we delve into the world 
of measures. 
 
3.4 Data 
 
As my thesis is a follow-up study of previous research, the initial data for my work is taken 
from the survey that has been conducted late in 2008 for the evaluation of the FORNY 
program  (Borlaug et al., 2009). The response rate was 72 out of 162 companies, giving a 
response rate of over 44% (Borlaug et al., 2009).   
I had to extract and code all the data from the survey, as well as collect a substantial amount 
of additional accounting data for all companies. This data was collected with the help of the 
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commercial RavnInfo database
3
, and automated data gathering tools
4
. The data was quality 
checked by hand as well. Subsequently this data was manually coded into the SPSS program 
for further use in the econometric analysis.  
Firms that have gone through a merger in this period of time 2008-2012 have been contacted 
through telephone as to establish the effect the acquired ASOs had on the sales of the new 
company. 
44% is quite a high answer rate for this type of studies, compared with other authors. The 
questionnaire was sent by email to the USOs- participants of the FORNY program. Therefore 
the sample is homogenous and purposeful. Questionnaire was presented in the official 
language of the country of Norway – Norwegian. The electronic web-tool for conducting 
surveys, Questback, was used for obtaining data. The receivers of initial email needed to 
follow the link and answer the pop-up questions from their computer, which subsequently 
allowed the researchers to obtain the full answers electronically. Questback also offers a 
feature of one-click exporting data into SPSS, the program that was used for analyzing the 
data and testing of my hypothesis. 
As it was partly mentioned in introduction chapter, I am not conducting a new survey, 
because on one side this is a follow-up investigation that will be built on initial data, with the 
supplement of rich secondary data on the sampled USOs, where I can use the conclusions 
derived from the rapport to support/prove my findings. On the other hand, the reason is that it 
is not sure that the results of a new survey would have been comparable to the initial sample if 
I performed it, (no guarantees that same firms will answer) and the conclusions derived from 
the initial rapport would have been hard to base my research on. It is worth mentioning that 
senior researchers of Bodø Graduate School of Business and Nordland Research Institute 
conducted the original survey. These are the main points. Among others are the lack of time 
given for the writing of master thesis and the fact that the FORNY program is officially over 
and the new FORNY 2020 has taken its place. 
 
3.4.1 Survey 
 
According to my literature review (see appendix) almost all quantitative studies of this kind 
make a questionnaire that they send by post or email to the research objects. My research is 
                                                
3
 http://ravninfo.no 
4
 Developed in-house by Nordland Research Institute 
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one of them. Positive sides of it are that it is fast and cheap and allows covering a large 
amount of respondents (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). It is impossible to think that a scientist 
could have asked over a 40 questions all 72 respondents of the survey in such a short time 
giving the credit to airline costs, remoteness of each respondent from each other and so on. 
Being presented by email the respondent can devote her time when it is appropriate without 
disturbing her plans. One can critique the usage of e-mail as something that can skew the 
results towards high-tech users, or in another way make the sample not representative for the 
whole population. When it comes to e-mail I would argue that this critique is not sufficiently 
grounded as the respondents are all taking part in business, are used to electronic 
communication from academia, and have a higher education. This leads me to conclude that 
there is no sample bias inherent in the usage of e-mail as a tool for collecting data. As it was 
mentioned Questback tool was used. Practically survey is a number of questions that ask 
either to type your data yourself or choose an answer from a variety given. All the 
respondents of this survey have a high degree of education (founders and managers of USOs) 
that gives a confidence that questions were understood and answered properly. 
However not everything is so easy and good with surveys. Not having a personal contact may 
seem to be of high importance. Email surveys can be ignored and answer rate can be low. 
There is a probability that the questions can be misunderstood or respondents will try to 
answer what he thinks the researcher wants to get from him instead of telling the true story. 
Here is the choice and construction of questions, possibility to choose one of the answers, 
instead of thinking and typing in your own data are useful (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, Collis 
and Roger, 2003). 
 
3.4.2 Data representativeness 
 
In order to check the representativeness of my sample, I have gathered the survival rates of 
the non-respondents to obtain the picture of the whole population of the Norwegian ASO - 
participants of the FORNY program. The results are represented in the table below. 
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Table  5 – Survival rates of the organizations 
 
Survey respondents Whole survey population 
N of companies 72 162 
Survived per 01.03.2012 58 124 
- of them merged 5 10 
Survival rate in % 0,806 0,765 
 
As we can see the survival rates of the organizations were nearly identical, while slightly 
higher in my respondents’ sample. It is important to keep in mind that the “whole survey 
population” counts for almost all participants of the FORNY program at the time of the data 
collection, something that assures the data representativeness of my sample. On 
recommendation of my colleagues I did not perform any extensive representativeness check 
since the deviation in survival rates is so small. In addition, the response rate of 44%, helps 
ensure the high quality of my data.  
All the data obtained was coded according with the recommendations of the researchers in 
this field of study, as well as screened and cleaned for errors with the help of SPSS program. 
Dependent variables were measured in 2010 and 2012, while independent ones are coming 
from a survey of late 2008, endogeneity problem should be minimized. This conclusion is 
made after the similar conclusions of the authors in the same field e.g. Clarysse et al. (2011).  
 
3.5 Measures   
 
My hypothesis has a character of multivariate analysis, meaning that several variables are 
taken into consideration at the same time (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). The measures were 
developed following the literature review conducted. Survival is measured by Cox regression 
of proportional hazards (Bertoni et al., 2011, Wennberg et al., 2011, Luke and S.M., 1998). In 
proportional hazards models time to event is taken into consideration, in my case time to fail. 
According to Bertoni et al.(2011 :1032), who have also used this regression, the use of it 
“gives maximum flexibility in the specification of the duration dependence of the hazard rate”. 
Hazard models are preferred over logit models for survival analysis as they can deal with 
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censored data (Zhang, 2009b, Buenstorf, 2007).  In my case the right-censored data. I believe 
that event occurrence is unrelated to censoring and Cox regression of proportional hazards can 
produce unbiased estimates of survival statistics. My observation has finished on the first of 
March in 2012, revealing 58 firms that have survived and 14 that have not. This model 
however assumes that some of the survived firms will also end their business in the future. 
Binary logistic regression and was used for the robustness check of the models (Bertoni et al., 
2011). Hypothesis 1a and b were both tested first separately (model 1 and 2) and then joined 
together to the full model (model 3); and only independent variables were checked in model 
(4). There were several reasons for that. First of all the probability of debt financing is not 
eliminating the probability of external equity funding and vice versa, in other words none of 
them is mutually exclusive (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). Therefore both types of financing 
can be presented in an USO at once, while having the opposite effect on the survival (as 
predicted by H1a and b). Model 3 is then a confirmation of the robustness of the results and is 
believed to better reflect/suit the situation that organizations are in (e.g. of testing several 
hypothesis in one model Clarysse et al. (2011). However model 1 and 2 are also important, as 
the number of useful cases is slightly higher there. For example not all of the firms are joint 
stock companies, and therefore could not be used for the H1b, however are included in H1a.  
Growth is a continuous variable and is measured by multiple linear regression in H2a and b 
and H3. This is in line with the literature review made (e.g. Cosh (2009), Bertoni et al. 
(2011); Clarysse et al. (2011); Zhang (2009a) and due to certain degree of availability of data 
and time. All the models are presented as “base”, including only predictors and “full”, 
including both predictors and independent variables adopted from Clarysse et al. (2011). I 
have also performed regressions with only independent variables to investigate if their 
explaining power of the growth variance is higher than predictors, and for use as a sort of a 
robustness check. The presentation of the independent variables alone and together with 
predictors gives a picture of additional additive effects that variables attribute to the 
dependent variable (see e.g. Robinson and Phillips McDougall  (2001), Clarysse et al. 
(2007b) Shane and Stuart (2002), Munari and Toschi (2011)).  
 
3.5.1 Dependant variables 
 
As it was presented before, I measure performance with two variables survival and growth in 
sales.  
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Below I explain the methods of their calculation for the further use in the econometrics 
analysis. 
 
3.5.1.1 Survival 
 
My dependent variable took the form of dummy (yes/no; 1/0) and indicates if the firm has or 
has not survived from the date of survey 2008 until 01.03.2012. Some assumptions though 
need to be cleared. As non-survivors I have included firms that went bankrupt or were 
dissolved before 01.03.2012 for survivors I have included firms that are operating in their 
original organization number as well as merged ones. This assumption is consistent with the 
research of Zhang (2009a) who supports my assumption: “from an economic point of view it 
is still alive”. I have contacted all firms that have merged in these years and asked to estimate 
what size of annual sales in the firm that purchased them could have been explained as a 
result of a merge (to be included in the growth models). During the interviews it was also 
confirmed that the personnel of the initial firms was retained and technologies continued to 
operate in new firms (Zhang, 2009a). Among the survivors there are two specific firms. One 
firm is currently a subject to bankruptcy proceedings for the second year, however is still 
registered. Another was recently deleted from the registry 17.03.2012 (no further information 
currently available). 
Those companies that have survived at least until 2011 and have delivered the annual 
accounting information for 2010 to the tax organizations, regardless to what have happened 
after, are further included in the model capturing the influence of indicators on growth. This 
particular design (from survival to growth) is adopted from Evans (1987). 
 
3.5.1.2 Growth  
 
Relative measures of growth as a dependant variable have been used in half of studies that 
Davidsson et al. (2006) have collected and over 29% were absolute measures. This work is 
following this pattern to easy the comparable strength of this study that is believed to be of 
high importance for the development of scientific knowledge (Davidsson et al., 2006). 
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My decision was therefore to count both of them, check the statistics and representativeness, 
correlations and decide which one to use for the models or both. 
For this work growth in sales is measured in line with Vanacker and Manigart (2010) as 
following : 
- absolute measure: growth in sales is presented as a difference between two points of 
time, more specific “sales 2010- sales 2008”, in line with Cosh et al. (2009). Due to low 
inflation in these years, it did not affect the strength of analysis. (this has been tested in SPSS, 
no major differences revealed and therefore are not presented in this work).  
- relative measure: growth in sales (turnovers), adopted from Lindelöf and Löfsten 
(2005) and Robinson and Phillips McDougall (2001) after the following model: 
        
    
  
 
    
  
       
    
    
   
 
                          (1) 
Wennberg et al. (2011), Robinson and McDougall (2001) and Cosh et al. (2009) have 
logarithmized their growth variables to reduce the skewness and approximate to the normal 
distribution. The same procedure was applied for my research. 
 
3.5.2 Independent variables 
 
Align with the study of Vanacker and Manigart (2010) I am not focusing on the amount of 
initial financing, rather on the amount or share of external investors that the USOs have 
succeeded to attract and the subsequent financial decisions. The last named was highlighted as 
an avenue for the further research and I am gladly following it.   
 
3.5.2.1 Debt capital 
 
The results of the survey give the possibility to obtain various information about the presence 
of debt capital and its sources. Therefore External debt capital was achieved by counting the 
number of investors while eliminating founders and such type of investors as family members 
and friends. Their willingness to continue the business can be different from traditional profit 
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making, as well as other conditions of obtaining may apply, usually easier and less 
demanding. Often being unprofessional their movements are not predicted by the theories but 
are rather spontaneous and are often based on close relationship to the founder(s). They are 
also less affected of information asymmetries (Karra et al., 2006). External debtors’ 
categories: universities, TTO and other commercializing actors, private equity funds, public 
institutions, banks and other financial institutions, other companies and others (Neff, 2003, 
Sørheim, 2003). The variable is coded with reference to the work of Vanacker and Manigart 
(2010) and Moray and Clarysse (2005).  
 
3.5.2.2 Equity capital 
 
Equity or external capital (1) took form of a cumulative variable taking into amount the 
proportion of the equity shares of different external shareholders (universities, TTO, seed and 
venture capital funds, banks and finance institutions, other companies and actors, excluding 
entrepreneurs-founders, friends, family and management of the company). I believe that 
excluded investors do not have information asymmetries problems and are not following the 
predictions of theories, rather their relations and internal wishes as it was described in this 
work before. This variable is coded with reference to the work of Cosh et al. (2009) and 
Vanacker and Manigart (2010).   
VC or external capital (2) (Lockett and Wright, 2005). This variable was coded as a 
multiplication of a dummy variable “Venture capitalists are presented in board” on the 
amount of “private equity funds as shareholders”. The result is ranking USOs from 0, 
meaning that there is either no VC funds in board or private equity funds are not shareholders 
in the company, to 4, meaning that VC funds are in board and own 50% and over of the shares 
in the company. 
 
3.5.3 Control variables 
 
Control variables are also predictors (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008). They do explain some of 
the behavior of dependant variable, though my interest is not primary lying in their 
explanation of the phenomena.  
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3.5.3.1 Age 
 
Age as a predictor is commonly used in this field of study e.g. Munari and Toschi (2011), 
Mueller et al. (2012), Zhang (2009b); Clarysse et al. (2011). The longer the firm have existed, 
the longer is its tracking history, hence more possibilities of obtaining external finance that 
leads to higher performance rates.  
As the time goes, firms obtain credible history, tracking record and reputation. In their 
development new ties and networks are being established. These factors reduce the 
information asymmetries and attract the potential investors to these companies, as the 
searching costs reduce for potential finance providers (Wright et al., 2006). Age is important 
variable, as entrepreneurs learn through time (Evans, 1987).  In his study of 100 
manufacturing industries he came to a conclusion that age is positively correlated with 
survival, however negative with growth of the firm (Evans, 1987).   
Age (1) This variable captures the age of company from the founding date until 2012 or until 
the year when the company was dissolved or went bankrupt. Variable is measured in years. 
Age (2) Measures the age of the companies until the year 2010 for the growth models. This 
variable was coded with reference to Clarysse et al. (2011) who also used this variable as a 
predictor in a study of growth of Spin-off companies.   
3.5.3.2 Size 
 
Size is measured using the spin-offs assets (in thousands of NOK) (Zahra et al., 2007). Zahra 
et al. (2007) explains that larger USOs join more external networks, gaining more knowledge 
and use more resources in new technologies/products. Evans (1987), who examined firms in 
manufacturing industries, revealed that there is a negative relationship between firms growth 
and size, however the probability of survival increases. 
For the survival the Size (1) measure was calculated, simply the natural logarithm of firms 
total assets in 2008. For the growth variable Size (2) was calculated as a natural logarithm of 
firm’s total assets in 2009. This measure is lagged to reduce the mentioned endogeneity e.g. 
Bertoni et al. (2011), Vanacker and Manigart (2010). Logarithms of Size (1) and Size (2) 
have reduced dramatically skewness (indication of how symmetric the variable distribution is) 
and kurtosis (the ‘peakedness’, or “spikiness”, of the variable), which is good for the 
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regression results (normal distribution) and is in line with the recent research in this field of 
study (Pallant, 2007).  
Descriptive statistics of all absolute and logarithmised values are presented in appendix. 
Overall the correlations between absolute/relative values and their logarithms are significant 
at p<0.01 level. Therefore I assume that the logarithms are representing the variables correct, 
while the suitableness for the regression increases as skewness and kurtosis have been 
significantly lower (Nerkar and Shane, 2003).  
Below I have summarized the variables used for the further analysis: 
Table  6 – Variables used for the econometrical analysis 
Name of 
variable 
Definition N of 
observations 
Min Max Mean St. 
deviation 
Reference to literature 
Dependent variables 
 
Survival Dummy variable 
1/0; where 
1=survived per 
01.03.2012; 0= 
have not 
survived 
69 0 1 Categorical Wennberg et al.(2011); 
Zhang (2009a); Nerkar 
and Shane (2003) measure 
failure; 
Ln 
(Growth 
absolute) 
Ln(sales 2010-
sales 2008+ 
constant) 
59 8,44 10,33 9,2279 ,24893 Bonardo (2011); Lindelöf 
and Löfsten (2005); 
Clarysse et al (2011); see 
Davidsson et al (2006); 
Vanacker and Manigart 
(2010)); Cosh et al.(2009)  
Ln(Growth 
relative) 
Ln((sales2010-
sales2009)/sales 
2009+(sales 
2009-
sales2008)/sales2
008)/2years+con
stant) 
59 -1,48 2,81 ,1097 ,6683 Robinson and Phillips 
McDougall (2001); 
Lindelöf and Löfsten 
(2005); similar 
logarithmised measure 
Evans (1987);  Wennberg 
et al (2011) 
Independent variables 
 
Debt  
 
Sum of external 
debt investors at 
the time of 
survey (2008) 
68 ,00 4,00 ,6765 ,9214 Moray and Clarysse 
(2005) use number of  
founders etc; Vanacker and 
Manigart (2010) – amount 
of share; Lindelöf and 
Löfsten (2005) percent of 
each debt investor;  
Equity The proportion 
of shares of 
external 
shareholders in 
the company 
(2008) 
From 0=0% to 
4=over 50% 
66 ,00 4,00 2,1426 1,1884 Similar measure (% of 
shares owned) see Cosh et 
al. (2009); similar measure 
(proportion of independent 
TMT members) see 
Bonardo et al (2011); in 
percent per investor see 
Lindelöf and Löfsten 
(2005) 
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Name of 
variable 
Definition N of 
observations 
Min Max Mean St. 
deviation 
Reference to literature 
VC VC in board and 
as shareholders 
in 2008(dummy 
1/0)*proportion 
of shares of 
venture capital 
funds in the 
company from 
0=0% ; 2=1-
25%; 3=25-50% 
to 4=over 50% 
59 ,00 4,00 ,6441 1,3867 Similar measure (% of 
shares owned) see Cosh et 
al. (2009); interaction 
variables (multiplication) 
see Mueller et al. (2012); 
similar measure VC-
backed firms (measured as 
dummy variable) see 
Bonardo et al. (2011); in 
percent per venture capital 
and venture capital (board) 
yes/no see Lindelöf and 
Löfsten (2005) 
 
Predictors 
 
Age (1) Age in years 
from start-up 
until 01.03.2012 
or until the 
organization 
finished it’s 
activity (rounded 
to the nearest 
whole) 
69 3,00 11,00 7,4348 2,0471 Robinson and Phillips 
McDougall (2001); Cosh 
et al. (2009); Mueller et al. 
(2012); (Zhang, 2009b)(in 
months); (Clarysse et al., 
2011); (Munari and 
Toschi, 2011) 
Age (2) Age in years 
from start-up 
until 2010 
(rounded to the 
nearest whole) 
59 2,00 9,00 5,6610 1,9880 (Robinson and Phillips 
McDougall, 2001); (Cosh 
et al., 2009); (Mueller et 
al., 2012); (Zhang, 
2009b)(in months); 
(Clarysse et al., 2011); 
(Munari and Toschi, 2011) 
Size (1) Ln(total assets 
2008) 
69 ,00 12,31 6,9569 2,5888 (Vanacker and Manigart, 
2010);  
(Cosh et al., 2009); 
(Bertoni et al., 2011) 
Size (2) Ln(total assets 
2009) 
59 3,71 12,26 7,5990 1,6672 (Vanacker and Manigart, 
2010);  
(Cosh et al., 2009); 
(Bertoni et al., 2011) 
 
As you can see the variables chosen are well grounded in existing literature in my field of 
research which gives me confidence that my work will be able to contribute with the 
additional knowledge on the subject after the hypothesis are tested by the means of 
econometrical methods.  
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4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
In this part of my work I present the calculations made with the SPSS program, shortly 
explaining my findings. 
 
4.1 Descriptive statistics  
 
First of all, 14 of 72 companies do not exist per date (01.03.2012), representing over 19% of 
sample. They were either dissolved or went bankrupt. Additional 5 companies have merged 
(7%). All companies that do not exist longer under their initial organization number (merged, 
dissolved and bankrupt) were under 9 years old. This is an interesting finding that I can try to 
explain. These companies are coming with a new idea or technology that is hopefully needed 
and demanded. Those who do not get the desired attention in the first years, therefore no 
foundation either are probably finishing their activity without achieving results. Those, on the 
other part, who seem very promising, are merging rather fast also. The destiny of the 
companies that are remaining active is then a puzzle. None of the companies in my sample 
have gone public (IPO) or undergone a trade sale.  
For the further analysis I had to reduce the number of respondents as there were 3 firms that 
finished their activity before the year 2008 that is taken as a start point for my analysis. 
By the end of 2008 over 72% (50/69) of firms have succeeded in attracting some form of 
external capital, over 56% (39/69) issued shares and over 50% (35/69) received a loan. Of 
them over 34% (24/69) of firms got both external debt and equity financing.  
Investors of debt capital were divided in 9 groups, and each respondent could have chosen 
several of them. The maximum score was 4 investors represented at once; minimum 0. (See 
appendix “descriptive statistics” for frequencies, percent and statistics). 
The average age of the company is a little over 7 years both for survival and growth analysis. 
10 of 12 companies that had private equity funds (VC) as shareholders have survived. The 
remaining two had the amount of shares under 50% and another under 25%.  
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4.2 Results  
 
H1a and b were tested by the Cox regression of proportional hazards in several steps in the 
SPSS program. Predictors Age and Size were taken in the base model, Debt was included to 
the base model in model 1; Equity was included to the base model in model 2; and at last both 
equity and debt were included to base model in model 3. Model 4 includes just independent 
variables to check whether their influence on the survival is significant without the predictors. 
SPSS statistics is in the appendix section, while here I present some of the findings in the 
table below:  
 
Table  7 – Determinants of the likelihood of failure. Cox regression. 
 Base 
model 
Model 1  
(Debt) 
Model 2 
 (Equity) 
Model 3  
Full 
Model 4 
(Debt+ 
Equity) 
Predictors 
 
     
Age (1) 0.729* 
 (0,175) 
0.709* 
(0.196) 
0.663** 
(0.187) 
0.627** 
(0.207) 
 
Size (1) 0.741*** 
(0,107) 
0.745*** 
(0.109) 
0.768** 
(0.109) 
0.769** 
(0.113) 
 
Independent 
variables 
 
     
External Debt  1.639** 
(0.223) 
 1.892*** 
(0.230) 
2.063*** 
(0.236) 
External Equity    0.676 
(0.242) 
(Sig. p=0.105) 
0.532** 
(0.296) 
 
0.545** 
(0.287) 
Results 
 
     
N of observations 69 68 66 65 65 
-2 Log likelihood 78.347 73.965 75.568 69.059 80.154 
Chi-Square 15.520 21.511 16.625 23.206 11.032 
Model 
significance 
p<0,001  
Supported 
p<0,001 
 Supported 
p=0,001 
Supported 
p<0,001 
Supported 
p=0,004 
Supported 
Coefficients in Hazard rate format. Standard errors in brackets 
* - significant at 0,1 level; ** - significant at 0,05 level; *** - significant at 0,01 level 
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All the models tested are statistically significant at p=0.01 level. Variables below the value 1 
(hazard ratios) are reducing the chance of failure and increasing the survival. These are 
Equity, Size (1) and Age (1). Debt, has a hazard ratio over 1 and each additional investor is 
increasing the chance of failure. Standard errors are all low. Correlation matrixes of 
regression (all models) do not have values that are over 0.5, thus I assume that 
multicollinearity is not an issue for these models. However it is noticeable that Debt is 
negatively correlated with Equity in models 3 and 4 with value over 0.4. 
Model 3 have the highest value of Chi-Square and the lowest value of -2Log likelihood and 
will be explained further and checked. Model 3, including all the independent variables and 
predictors was statistically significant, X
2
(4, N=65) =23.21, p<0.001. All variables are 
significantly contributing to the model at 5 percent level, while Debt at 1 percent level. 
Before we delve into conclusions, I want to present the results of the robustness check (model 
3). Robustness check was computed by the means of binary logistic regression, taking into 
account that dependant variable – survival is categorical (1/0). Binary logistic regression is 
calculating odd rates instead of hazard rates in Cox regression, and cannot deal with censored 
data, as well as not taking time to failure into consideration unlike Cox regression, where time 
to failure was coded in months and tied to the survival variable. While performing the test it 
was found that the predictor variable Size is disturbing the results, influencing on the 
significance of other variables, bringing multicollinearity (correlations between independent 
variables in a model over 0.7 and 0.8), and in the end found not to be significantly 
contributing to the model even if the order of inclusion in the model was changed. The results 
are represented in appendix. In the first step (block 1) independent variables Debt(1) and 
Equity(1) were included. This model is statistically significant, X
2
(2, N=65)=10.52, p<0.01. 
This model as a whole explained between 14,9% (Cox and Snell R Square) and 25% 
(Nagelkerke R squared) of the variance in survival, and correctly classified 84,6% cases. In 
step 2 (block 2) Age was included to the previous variables. Overall model was still 
significant, X
2
(3, N=65) =15.33, p<0.01. Between 21% and 35,2% of the variance of survival 
was explained, correctly classifying 89,2% of cases. All variables were significantly 
contributing to the model  each with p<0.05. Size was added to the above named 3 variables 
in step 3 (block 3).  While the model was still statistically significant (p<0.01), this step 
contribution was not significant for the model p >0.3, and the overall fit of the variables 
decreased. The percent of correctly classified cases did not improve and was still 89,2%. The 
same results were reported when the variable Size was tried to be added right after 
independent variables, before Age predictor. The contribution of the step was not significant. 
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Hosmer and Lemeshow test, which is stated to be “the most reliable model fit in SPSS” 
(Pallant, 2007: 178), was above 0,05 in all steps of the model, therefore indicating it’s 
support. Overall robustness check has confirmed the statistical significance of the model.  
Below in Table  8 I conducted model 3 (excluding the predictor Size (1) from the model 3) for 
the comparison purposes and below have extracted the statistics of the variables in the 
equation for both Cox regression and binary logistic regression (Table  9) as a visual 
presentation of the above mentioned manipulations.  
Table  8 – Cox regression of proportional hazards, model 3 (without Size (1))  
Variables in the Equation 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Debt  ,651 ,227 8,211 1 ,004 1,917 
Equity  -,751 ,296 6,412 1 ,011 ,472 
Age (1) -,479 ,210 5,210 1 ,022 ,620 
 
Table  9 – Binary logistic regression, predicting survival (step 2), constant included in model 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 Debt  -1,061 ,419 6,410 1 ,011 ,346 
Equity  ,757 ,359 4,436 1 ,035 2,131 
Age (1) ,461 ,234 3,876 1 ,049 1,586 
Constant -2,071 1,758 1,388 1 ,239 ,126 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Age (1). 
(Exact model, without constant included have also been performed (note constant is not significantly 
contributing). The results remained within the same boundaries, while only 86,2% of cases were classified 
against 89,2% in the model presented).   
 
Note that Cox regression predicts that company will not survive (hazard), while binary 
logistic regression predicts the survival of the organization. This explains the difference in 
signs and size for B and Exp(B), however the interpretation remains the same. All variables 
included are significant at p<0.05. 
After performing these regressions I can deliver the results. Hypothesis 1a and b are 
supported. Further discussion will be presented in the next chapter.      
H2a and b will follow a multiple linear regression method of approaching, as growth is a 
continuous variable. Coding of variables was already discussed in the measures section and 
descriptive statistics is presented in the appendix.  
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Before I present the models I would like to say some words about the correlations revealed. 
Both growth measures are significantly correlated with each other at p<0.05. Therefore I 
believe both can be used for further analysis. However, due to the limit of space and time, I 
will use the natural logarithm of absolute measure for the models. Size of the firms was found 
to be significantly positively correlated with growth at p<0.05 level. Noticeable that Equity 
variable is negatively correlated with age at  p=0.055 level, meaning that younger ASOs have 
higher amount of shares in the hands of external shareholders than more mature/ older ones. 
Testing of H2a and b is presented in the table below. 
 
Table  10 – Influence of external funding on growth in sales  
 Base Model (5) 
Debt 
Model (6) 
Equity 
Model (7) 
Full 
Model (8) 
Independent 
variables 
Predictors      
Age (2) -0,054 -0,052 0,016 0,023  
Size (2) 0,260** 0,264** 0,309** 0,316**  
Independent 
variables 
     
Debt   0,072  0,123 0,101 
Equity    -0,010 -0,025 0,013 
Results      
N 
observations 
58 57 55 55 54 
R
 
Square 
(Adjusted R 
Square) 
0.069 
(0.036) 
0.075 
(0.024) 
0.095 
(0,043) 
0.11 
(0.039) 
0.011 
(-0.27) 
Model 
significance 
p>0.134 
Not supported 
p>0.236 
Not 
supported 
p>0.154 
Not 
supported 
p>0.203 
Not 
supported 
p>0.75 
Not 
supported 
Standardized coefficients beta are presented.  
* - significant at 0,1 level; ** - significant at 0,05 level; *** - significant at 0,01 level 
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Interactions in each model were added simultaneously to control for possible 
multicollinearity. Model, including only independent variables and omitting predictors was 
tested, though without success. None of the models was statistically significant; therefore H2a 
and b are not supported. Noticeable that size remained strongly significant, positively 
contributing to the growth. Further conclusions are presented in next chapter. 
H3 was suggested to be checked in the same regression type (multiple linear regression) 
including predictors, and debt variable along the independent variable VC. This is also due to 
the access to VC does not diminish the opportunity of an USO to obtain debt capital. However 
the variable Equity cannot be applied for this analysis as it is partly containing VC variable.  
Correlations and descriptive statistics are represented in the appendix. Note that already 
outside the model, VC is significantly correlated with growth (at 0.01 level) and both size 2 
and debt (at 0.05 level). Size 2 is still correlated with growth at 0.05 level. The size of the 
Pearson correlations is under 0.4 which allows me to include these variables in the model,  
however attention to possible multicollinearity should be kept in mind (Pallant, 2007, Hair et 
al., 2009). The results of the regression analysis are presented in the appendix chapter, while 
the main conclusions are in the table 11. Interactions in each model were added 
simultaneously to control for possible multicollinearity. Statistics was checked for each 
model. However no multicollinearity was revealed with SPSS tests (all tolerance values over 
0.1 and variance inflation factors under 10), after including the VC variable in base model, the 
Size (2) variable has lost its statistical significance. As we see beta coefficient of Size (2) have 
also reduced, due to all the overlapping effects of these variables have been statistically 
removed (Pallant, 2007, Robinson and Phillips McDougall, 2001). Debt and Age (2) 
variables were not significant in any model.  
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Table  11 – Influence of presence of VC on board and as shareholder on growth in sales 
 Base 
(obtained 
from 
previous 
testing) 
Model (9) 
VC 
Model (10) 
VC+Size(2) 
Model (11) 
VC+Debt 
full model 
Model (12) 
No Age (2) 
Model (13) 
Debt+Equity 
(independent 
variables) 
Predictors 
 
      
Age (2) -0,054 -0.007  -0.010   
Size (2) 0,260** 0.160 0.160 0,159 0.158  
Independent 
variables 
 
      
Debt     -0,024 -0.024 -0.045 
VC  0,344*** 0,345*** 0,352** 0.354** 0,403*** 
Results 
 
      
F statistics, 
 variance 
F(2,56) 
=2,082 
F(3, 55) 
=3,914 
F(2, 56) 
=5,976 
F(4, 53) 
=2,863 
F(3, 54) 
=3,886 
F(2, 55) 
=5,045 
R
 
Square 
(Adjusted R 
Square) 
0.069 
(0.036) 
0.176 
 (0.131) 
0.176 
(0.146) 
0.178 
(0.116) 
0.178 
(0.132) 
0.155 
(0.124) 
Model 
significance 
p>0.134 
Not 
supported 
p<0.05 
Supported 
p<0.01 
Supported 
p<0.05 
Supported 
p<0.05 
Supported 
p=0.01 
Supported 
Standardized coefficients beta are presented.  
* - significant at 0,1 level; ** - significant at 0,05 level; *** - significant at 0,01 level 
 
 
The highest Adjusted R Square was achieved in model (10) explaining 14,6% of the variance, 
F (2, 56)=5,976, p<0.01. The only variable that was statistically significant was VC with beta 
= 0,345, p<0.01.  
H3 is supported. Further discussion is presented in next chapter. 
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5 DISCUSSION 
 
In this chapter I present the results of the econometric analysis performed, discuss my 
findings and bring forward suggestions for future research. Limitations and implications are 
also provided. 
 
5.1 Results 
 
The aim of this paper was to reveal the differences between the influence of external debt and 
equity financing on the performance of the young new ventures. As a performance measures 
survival and growth in sales were utilized as commonly used indicators in this field of study 
(e.g. Bertoni et al. (2011); Cosh et al. (2009); Vanacker and Manigart (2010); Lindelöf and 
Löfsten (2005); Zhang (2009a). For data set new academic start-ups, participants of the 
FORNY program were used.  
In my sample of 72 organizations only 58 are still in business per 01.03.2012. The remaining 
14 were either dissolved or went bankrupt. Currently one company has finished its activity 
(17.03.2012) however no information about the reason of closing down is yet available. One 
company is currently under the bankruptcy procedures. 4 of the organizations that do not exist 
per today were related to commercializing actor Norinnova & TTO Nord. The rest of TTO 
have lost 1 or 2 companies through this period (see appendix-conclusion).      
Though it was not in the aim of the study, the testing of hypothesis have revealed that age is 
positively correlated with survival, meaning that older firms survive better than younger. This 
finding is in line with the findings of Evans (1987) who tested 100 manufacturing industries 
in the UK. Larger firms also survive better than smaller ones and grow better as well. Evans 
(1987) on his turn concluded that larger firms survive better, however there is a negative 
relationship between their size and growth. This contradiction in the relationship between 
growth and size is therefore interesting and might be a subject for further research. 
Now let us turn to hypothesis. H1 a and b were supported.  The higher  the amount of shares 
of external shareholders the organization has, the higher are its chances to survive, while each 
external lender of debt capital reduces the chance of survival. This finding can be possibly 
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explained out from the nature of these external funding possibilities. External equity investors 
are “assets lenders” however debt investors are “cash flow lenders”. The increase in the 
amount of debt issued also increases the probability of a financial distress and moral hazard, 
while the issue of additional capital does not (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). As it was 
highlighted ASOs often start without clear product for market and need time to develop the 
technology, therefore the earnings are low and the possibility to repay the debt in time can be 
reduced (Lindelöf and Löfsten, 2005). On the other hand, to succeed in obtaining external 
shareholders the firm and investors should overcome the problem of information asymmetries 
(Cosh et al., 2009). Different authors stress the attention on that NTBF have rather immature 
top management team, compared to other ventures (Ensley and Hmieleski, 2005). Others add 
that scientists and business people have different views on the development of the firm that 
often contradict with each other. Gurdon and Samson (2010) concluded that those scientists 
who had conflict between science and business values have failed. Therefore the presence of 
the external investors can be thought to increase the firm’s quality. Clarysse et al. (2007a) 
prove this by pointing that ASOs are usually resource-poor and external shareholders “may 
play an important role in accessing critical external resources”. Among them are: adding 
complementary skills to the founding team and expanding the networks of the ASOs 
(Clarysse et al., 2007a, Ortín-Ángel and Vendrell-Herrero, 2010).  
As I have suggested, since the hypothesis are supported, following the pecking order will be 
counterproductive. In contrast with this theory debt and equity capital cannot be seen as equal 
substitutes to the internal funding (Vanacker and Manigart, 2010). Also agency theory is not 
a reasonable choice to behave after since following it the debt financing is preferred to equity 
funding due to the unwillingness of owners to have a capital dilution. H2a and b failed to 
reveal whether it is a relationship between additional debt and equity and the growth in sales 
of the ASOs. There was however found that the size is positively and significantly correlated 
with the growth in sales.  
Percent of external equity in a firm was also negatively correlated with age in this hypothesis 
meaning that younger firms gain more external equity financing. One of the reasons that can 
explain this phenomena is that the rules of becoming a member of the FORNY project and get 
a proof-of-concept have been continuously strengthening during the project time of 1995-
2010 and projects with better quality has been chosen. Also, as the time went this project has 
gained more attention and attracted more investors.  
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H3 was supported. The findings suggest that venture capital investments and presence of 
venture capitalists in board significantly influence the growth in sales of the firm. This is 
consistent with the recent findings of Bertoni et al. (2011). Mueller et al. (2012) with 
reference to Colombo and Grilli (2007) also suggests that Venture Capital investment may 
stimulate growth of the USOs. In my sample it has been also revealed that VC backed firms 
grow in size and have attracted more debt financing actors than other firms. Cosh et al. (2009) 
also revealed that recent literature confirms that venture capitalists assist in the development 
of the firm not only by supplying it with finance. Shane and Stuart (2002) have concluded 
that presence of venture investors increases chances of obtaining external funding and is the 
only determinant for the successful IPO. However Knockaert et al. (2009) concluded that only 
venture capital is improbable to add value and overcome the resource deficit in ASO.     
However presence of external shareholders bears the consequences. The owner-founder is not 
the only leader of the company and is often required to follow the milestones obliged by a VC 
shareholder. This finding therefore is contradicting with the traditional pecking order theory. 
According to Myers and Majluf (1984) the loss of control is the worst scenario and the firms 
should avoid this by all means by first funding the projects with their internal earnings, then 
addressing themselves to the debt market and finally as the last resort try an additional equity 
financing.    
Agency theory suggest that it is advisable for venture capital to have outside board members 
in order to monitor the behavior of management (Clarysse et al., 2007a). In addition, it can 
add value by bringing management skills, networks and other forms of human capital 
(Clarysse et al., 2007a). If this is the case, performance of ASOs that have venture capital on 
the board of directors should be higher, and my findings in regards to hypothesis 3 supports 
this. As discussed by Bertoni et al. (2011) it is difficult to ascertain whether or not this 
performance effect is due to “treatment” (what value VC adds) versus the “selection” effect 
(potential profitable a priori.) For other investors that are looking for signaling effects, this 
does not matter. 
Overall the findings suggest that differences in the funding of the ASOs contribute differently 
to its subsequent performance. I suggest that these findings are consistent with Garmaise 
(2001) and indicate the reverse pecking order, meaning that investors have better 
understanding of the quality of the company rather than entrepreneurial firm and their 
presence adds value to the firm. It then gets understandable why a vast amount of literature is 
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concerned about equity funding, particularly VC funding. This study was not an exeption and 
confirmed that external equity funding enhances the survival and VC funding and presence in 
board helps firms to grow.    
However this research was not without limitations. Therefore they and proposals for future 
studies are presented below.  
 
5.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 
As any study of this type, this one is also not without limitations. In my study I have utilized 
the data on the resources that are already successfully achieved. However it would be of great 
interest to determine whether the achieved ones and those that have been sought for are the 
same or the companies had to find substitutes and on what costs. How much of these 
decisions are influenced by the information asymmetries? This would share more light on 
whether the firms in their prior actions are following the pecking order theory, the reversed 
pecking order or agency theory 
From the investors’ side it is interesting what procedures, documents and numbers different 
investors ask for prior to funding. Do they differ from those that are asked from corporate 
spin-offs or other young firms? What mechanisms lie in their actions to eliminate the 
information asymmetries? And what differences there are among the variety of the investors 
and whose investments are more successful.    
The most interesting is probably to observe the dynamics of the process: whether the 
influence of venture capitalists funding and presence in board of directors changes towards 
ASOs over time? Do the founders-owners of ASO learn by doing? Do they feel the limits of 
their debt capacity better and whether their knowledge of the utilizing different financing 
sources improves?  
By performing a longitudinal study on a selection of ASOs I could be able to see if there is a 
development over time in the above mentioned areas. It would be particularly interesting to 
investigate how the role of the external financing develops, as the benefits that external capital 
brings to ASO might not be as useful for older, larger and more mature firms. 
Comparative studies utilizing this work as a reference are highly appreciated. 
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5.3 Implications 
 
This research has been conducted to fill the gap of the empirical research in the area of 
information asymmetries, external capital acquisition and subsequent performance. The 
existence of the gap was indicated in the works of Garmaise (2001), Pazos et al. (2010) and 
Cosh et al. (2009).  This question was tested on the specific form of start-ups – academic 
spin-offs, participants of the FORNY program in Norway. This research have revealed that 
the behavior patterns of the firm do not follow the traditional pecking order, rather the 
reverse pecking order (Garmaise, 2001).   
The findings are consistent with the recent findings of the researchers in this field, namely 
that the presence of external equity can ensure the survival and that venture capital funding is 
of highest importance for the growth of the firm. Therefore FORNY program and TTOs 
particularly should include the establishment of broader networks and relationships with 
external investors. It is proven that among others the unique network system that is 
established by the venture capitalists, firms, media etc lies in the grounds of the Silicon Valley 
success history (Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009). I believe that by establishing these ties the 
problem of information asymmetries can be reduced and the amount of successful IPO and 
trade sales increases. 
For the ASOs it would be reasonable to weigh all advantages and disadvantages of the 
external financing particularly thinking about the possibility to deliver it to the end and get the 
product ready for the market. Therefore funding through external shareholders or “asset 
lenders” should be sought prior to debt financing due to the extras that this type of finance 
cares with itself. These are among others the lacking managerial skills and network ties as 
well as the possibility of long-time utilization of the financing (Zahra et al., 2007).  Utilizing 
agency theory I found that the presence of external shareholders in the form of VC increases 
the value of the firm if they are also present in the board of directors. This places my study in 
line with Shane and Stuarts’ (2002) research.  
While my study does not cover whether there is a selection or treatment effect of VC on 
ASOs, it does seem like their active presence improves performance. This makes it seem like 
taking active ownership is a better investment strategy than just providing financial capital. 
This might be the case for such potential shareholders such as banks and financial institutions; 
public organizations and others.     
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5.4 Conclusions 
 
As predicted relying on debt and excluding external capital is correlated with a higher rate of 
failure, which makes my findings support the reversed pecking order theory (Garmaise, 
2001). One possible explanation for this observation may be due to poor cash-flows in the 
ASOs, which makes it difficult to handle debts. Well informed equity holders on the other 
hand, will most probably be aware of the unstable, and often non existing revenue streams 
from the ASOs and will rely on future payouts in the form of increased stock price, either 
through an IPO or a trade sale. This indicates that the external equity holders are able to 
overcome the information asymmetries inherent in their relationship vis-à-vis the ASOs, 
something that is in line with the reverse pecking order theory. My contribution to the extant 
literature is that I have found that increasing external equity and avoiding debt, is also true for 
pre-IPO companies. While current research only studies post-IPO businesses, a flaw which 
has been pointed out by Bertoni et al. (2011) and Cosh et al.(2009) among others, my 
research amends that by showing external capital’s positive influence on survival on pre-IPO 
companies. Another flaw that plagues this field of study is the perception of external capital 
as a homogeneous factor according to Shane and Stuart (2002), and Vanacer and Manigart 
(2010). I have shown that differing external capital sources can have different effects on 
performance in the form of survival. 
Hypothesis 2, unlike 1, was not supported. No research has been done on this relation in the 
field of ASOs to my knowledge. As ASOs typically have either low production or 
underdeveloped products, and therefore long time to market, debt does not seem to increase 
production and sales. Gathering external capital seems to be of the same reasons, and is thus 
not correlated to increase in sales. In other words, my hypothesis has failed in showing 
significant correlations between performance in the form of growth in sales and different 
sources of external funding. Pazos and Lòpez (2010) urged for the study of certain kinds of 
external capital in this context, but my research was not able to show any significant 
correlations. 
My final hypothesis was supported, indicating that venture capitalists in particular have a 
positive influence on the growth of sales in ASOs as long as they are present on the board of 
directors. While this might appear to be incongruent with my findings in hypothesis 2, this is 
not necessarily the case. VC’s involvement can be due to the wish to be more engaged in the 
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operation of companies that are already in the sales phase. In this scenario, they can contribute 
positively in areas that the founders themselves are not proficient in, such as business 
management, production networks and market know-how.  
My contribution to the extant body of theory is that I discovered that the capital structure of 
the ASOs seems to affect the performance but only in non-financial terms. However I 
discovered that financial performance increases when the external equity is in the form of 
venture capital as long as they also have members on the board of directors. The deviation 
between hypothesis 2 and 3 might be explained by the strengths that VC can bring to the 
managerial side of the firm. Also the effect of contributing with networks and other forms of 
human capital might be the reason to why firms that  have venture capitalists on the board of 
directors fare better than those who do not. This can be explained by agency theory as a 
means for the principal (venture capital) to avoid moral hazard (focus on technology 
development instead of performance), and overcome information asymmetry (venture capital 
arguably have more information about what is needed to grow a business).  
While I have shown that external equity does have a positive contribution to success in at 
least one area of performance, much work remains to be done. After all, no on single 
theoretical perspective can fully explain this complex phenomenon (Clarysse et al., 2007a). I 
hope that my thesis will be able to contribute to the growing body of research regarding 
external capitals roles in the performance of ASOs.  
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(2007b) 
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face-to-face 
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statistics; 
general least 
squares 
regression 
analysis with 
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SO with formal technology transfer (TT) start 
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TT. TTO are influencing the development of 
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Colombo et al. 
(2010) 
empirical; 
absorptive 
capacity 
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sources; 
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to-face follow 
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analysis; 
augmented 
Gibrat panel 
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academic USOs. Commercial orientation has a 
negative effect on the growth of ASO while 
scientific quality has a positive effect. 
Cosh et al. 
(2009) 
pecking 
order 
theory; 
reversed 
pecking 
order 
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entrepreneurial 
firms  
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statistics; 
correlation 
matrix; 
multivariate 
empirical 
analysis  
UK UK 
External finance is seldom available in the 
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institutiona
l theory 
0 1 102 high-
technology 
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high-technology 
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Perceived 
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Interpersonal 
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Blau’s 
Categorical 
Index; 
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USO are more immature in their top 
management team (TMT) dynamics, also their 
TMTs are more homogenous 
Evans (1987) theories of 
firm 
growth 
0 1 All firms 
operating in 100 
manufacturing 
industries 
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Data from 
Small 
Business Data 
Base (SBDB) 
Descriptive 
statistics; 
second-order 
logarithmic 
expansions; 
variability 
functions 
US US Probability of firm failure and growth 
decreases with age, consistent with predictions 
of Jovanovic (1982). Growth also decreases 
with firm size, meaning that Gibrat’s Law fails 
for small firms.  
Ferrary and 
Granovetter  
(2009) 
complex 
network 
theory 
(CNT); 
systemic 
1 0 Twelve 
economic agents 
types interacting 
in Silicon 
Valley ( among 
literature on 
the field of 
study; 
secondary 
source data ( 
case study of 
complex 
network of 
Silicon Valley 
FR, 
US 
US Innovation and entrepreneurship is driven by 
high number of agents; CNT points to unique ( 
particular) functions of VC that provide 
(support) robustness of the system: funding, 
selecting the projects, signaling, accumulating 
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exploratory 1 0 17 scientist-
started ventures 
previous 
research; 
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dataset 
multiple case 
study design 
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NL 
US Successful ventures had effective management 
team processes and access to capital. Scientists 
and business people share different frames of 
reference. Those scientists who failed had 
conflict between business and science values. 
Heirman and 
Clarysse  
(Heirman and 
Clarysse, 
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descriptive 0 1 99 unique cases 
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founded in 
Flanders 
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cluster analysis; 
Pearson chi-
Square test of 
significance; 
Kruskal-Wallis 
test of 
significance 
BE BE Authors found a considerable heterogeneity 
(variety) of RBSUs starting conditions. They 
suggest that financial, technological and 
human capital influence each other; 42% of 
start-ups were prospectors with no clear 
picture of their business model, 22% as pure 
service start-ups and only ; only 6% of start-
ups succeed in obtaining VC in the first year. 
Knockaert, 
M., M. Wright, 
et al. (2009)  
agency 
theory, 
human 
capital 
theory 
0 1 68early stage 
VC investment 
managers 
Europe 
interviews descriptive 
statistics; 
Mann-Whitney 
U test; binary 
logistic 
regression; 
correlation 
BE, 
UK 
EU VC funds that received  public capital and 
funds working close with entrepreneurs are 
looking more optimistic ( confident) on 
investing in academic SOs. VC are improbable 
to add  value or overcome resource deficit in 
ASOs 
Lindelöf, P. descriptive 1 1 134 NTBF in questionnaire Pearson SE SE  Science Parks play an important role to start a 
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and 60 from 
private sector 
correlations; t-
tests;  
USO and attract financing, serves for advisory 
functions. USOs perform lower due to 
academic entrepreneurs are partly employed in 
universities and are less committed to the 
growth. 
Moray and 
Clarysse 
(2005) 
longitudina
l case 
study; 
organizatio
nal/instituti
onal 
perspective 
1 1 one public 
research 
organization 
interviews 
with senior 
managers 
involved in 
technology 
transfer; 
secondary 
data 
descriptive 
statistics; 
correlations 
BE BE Establishing an incubator is a learning process 
where managers adapt their decisions through 
the time and conditions. Managing finance 
resources has been the largest difference since 
then. As seed phase was not interesting for 
VC, Incubation Fund was established; IRR 
management was changed; international 
business attracted for coaching etc  
Munari and 
Toschi 
(2011) 
 descriptive  0  1  247 new 
ventures (123 
ASO; 124 other 
companies) 
 Use of 
databases like 
Venture 
expert 
 descriptive 
statistics, 
correlations, 
logit 
regressions 
 IT UK private VC in contrast with public VC devote 
less attention to the scientific reputation of the 
university for their financing decisions on 
ASOs. VC have no bias in investing in ASOs 
(invest in both ASOs and non ASOs the same) 
 
 
Nerkar and 
Shane (2003) 
study 
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concentrati
on and 
radicalness 
of 
technology 
0 1 128 of 134 USO 
licensed 
between 1980 
and 1996 
data from 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office of the 
Massachusetts 
Institute of 
Technology; 
model “failure” 
of a start-up; 
Weibull model; 
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US US Patent scope and technological radicalness 
reduce failure of new firm only in fragmented 
markets 
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secondary 
data; 
unstructured 
interviews 
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founders;  
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Niosi (2006) descriptive 0 1 65 publicly 
quoted 
companies 
(spin-offs from 
Canadian 
universities) 
NRC 
database; 
SEDAR 
website and 
other 
descriptive 
statistics; 
correlations; 
regressions 
CA CA ASOs who obtained help from Industrial 
Research Assistance Program and patents 
grew more than venture backed  biotechnology 
spin-offs 
Ortín-Ángel, 
P. and F. 
Vendrell-
Herrero 
(2010) 
pecking 
order 
theory; 
complemen
tary assets 
view 
0 1 64 Spanish 
technological 
firms: 40 
university spin-
offs (8%) and 24 
independent 
start-ups 
questionnaire cross-section 
analysis; testing 
of 4 hypothesis 
ES ES In consistency with complementary assets 
view academic entrepreneurs use venture 
capitalists for access to managerial skills. 
Same results after control of finance 
constraints, debt levels and protection of 
intellectual property 
O’Shea, R. P., 
T. J. Allen, et 
al. (2005) 
resource-
based view 
0 1 141 U.S. 
University, 
giving 987 
university-year 
observations 
(141*7) 
database; 
survey 
Negative 
binomial  
models 
US US Higher degree of industry-university 
collaboration is recommended by authors; they 
found positive effect of industry-level funding 
to increase in technology  transfer 
Pazos, D. R., pecking 0 1 72 Spanish survey; econometric ES ES  Growth opportunities of USOs are negatively 
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S. F. Lòpez, et 
al. (2010) 
order 
theory; 
agency 
theory; 
trade-off 
theory 
USOs (19%  
response rate) 
S.A.B.I. 
database 
analysis; 
regression; 
univariate, 
multivariate 
analysis; 
related to debt level; authors define pecking 
order theory and agency theory to be more 
explicate and capturing than  trade-off theory 
Shane and 
Stuart (2002) 
Social 
capital 
theory; 
historical 
study 
0 1 134 firms 
founded during 
1980-1996 
Technology 
Licensing 
Office 
archives and 
interviews 
with firms 
principals 
covariations; 
piecewise-
exponential 
function; 
approach from 
Kalbfleisch and 
Prentice (1980) 
US US Authors found that presence of VC funding is 
the most important factor contributing to the 
probability of university start-up to undergo 
IPO; “the presence of direct and indirect  ties 
to venture investors prior to firm founding” 
decreases mortality probability and increases 
chances for obtaining external funding  
Walter (2006) network 
capabilities 
0 1 149 USO questionnaire 
(mail) 
correlations, 
moderated 
regression 
analysis 
DE, 
DK 
DE Performance variables and long-term survival 
are influenced by USO network capability. 
Entrepreneurial orientation (EO) did not have 
a significant effect financial growth of USO. 
Wennberg et 
al. (2011) 
industrial 
research 
0 1 528 ASO and 
8663 corporate 
spin-offs 
Longitudinal 
dataset from 
various 
sources 
unviariate, 
multivariate 
analysis; event 
history analysis 
SE, 
US,
UK 
SE Parent organization means more for CSO than 
ASOs, while industry experience means more 
for ASOs. 
Wright, M., A. 
Lockett, et al. 
(2006) 
finance 
pecking 
order 
theory 
1 1 124 of 125 
universities 
members 
AURIL & 
UNICO; 27 VC 
firms in UK; 50 
questionnaire; 
detailed 
interviews; 
face to face 
interviews 
? triangulation; 
statistical 
analysis 
UK UK, 
EU 
“mismatch between demand and supply side of 
market”, authors find consistency and 
inconsistency with pecking order theory: VC 
prefer to invest after proof of concept has been 
gained, in other words after seed stage; 
however TTOs do not see internal funds to be 
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Key findings 
universities in 
Europe and 65 
VC firms 
more important in early stages, but rather VC 
Wright, M., A. 
Vohora, et al. 
(2004) 
inductive 1 0 4 university 
spinouts: 2 
USOs and 2 
JVSOs 
36 in-depth 
face-to-face 
interviews; 
telephone 
interviews; 
observations 
multiple case 
study design 
UK UK JVSO have advantage (competencies) before 
USO in opportunity recognition, creating a 
balanced team, “attaining credibility in the 
business environment”; “achieving 
sustainability through the ability of these new 
venture to become established firms within 
their respective markets” 
Zahra et al. 
(2007) 
Knowledge
-based 
theory 
0 1 91 CSO and 78 
USO 
mail  survey; 
secondary 
sources 
 Means and 
standard  
deviations, 
intercorrelation
s, MANCOVA, 
regressions  
US, 
ES 
US  Corporate and USO differ in their 
performance.  USOs lack commercial skills 
and do not benefit from their parent 
universities as CSOs do from their parent 
firms.  
CSOs outperform USOs in ROA; while USOs 
outperformed CSOs in revenue growth 
Zhang, J. 
(2009) 
exploratory 0 1 10530 
entrepreneurs 
associated with 
6359 firms; 903 
academic 
entrepreneurs 
founded 704 
university spin-
offs 
data from 
VentureOne 
database 
Pearson’s X2 
tests; 
multivariate 
analyses; OLS 
regression 
analysis; logit 
regressions; 
probit models 
US US Authors findings include that USO have a 
higher survival rate than other SO; however 
there are no differences in amount of VC 
raised per round and totally, probability of 
profit making or increasing the number of 
employees.   
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2 Descriptive statistics 
 
Preparing and improving data for testing. Descriptive statistics of absolute, relevant and logarithmised measures of variables Growth  
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Ln(Growth absolute) 59 8,44 10,33 9,2279 ,24893 1,899 ,311 10,363 ,613 
Growth absolute 
2008-2010 
59 -5352,00 20679,00 557,1071 3675,90945 4,149 ,311 20,008 ,613 
Ln(Growth relative) 59 -1,48 2,81 ,1097 ,66832 1,250 ,311 4,348 ,613 
Growth relative 59 -,77 15,67 ,5312 2,22904 5,856 ,311 38,316 ,613 
Valid N (listwise) 59         
 
 
 
Preparing and improving data for testing. Descriptive statistics of absolute, relevant and logarithmised measures of variables Size  
 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Std. Error Statistic Std. Error 
Size (2) 59 3,71 12,26 7,5990 1,66720 ,327 ,311 ,660 ,613 
totassabs2009 59 41,00 210322,00 9905,2606 30589,25020 5,432 ,311 33,070 ,613 
Size (1) 59 ,00 12,31 7,2527 2,14706 -,688 ,311 2,278 ,613 
totassabs2008 59 ,00 222501,00 9888,7593 32160,92860 5,576 ,311 34,459 ,613 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
59 
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Correlations between logarithms and original variables, proving that the pattern is remaining 
the same: 
 
Correlations for Growth variables 
 Ln(Growth 
absolute) 
Growth 
absolute 2008-
2010 
Ln(Growth 
relative) 
Growth 
relative 
Ln(Growth absolute) Pearson Correlation 1 ,955
**
 ,276
*
 ,097 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,034 ,465 
N 59 59 59 59 
Growth absolute 
2008-2010 
Pearson Correlation ,955
**
 1 ,219 ,064 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,096 ,629 
N 59 59 59 59 
Ln(Growth relative) Pearson Correlation ,276
*
 ,219 1 ,802
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,034 ,096  ,000 
N 59 59 59 59 
Growth relative Pearson Correlation ,097 ,064 ,802
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,465 ,629 ,000  
N 59 59 59 59 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
 
 
Correlations for Size variables 
 Size (2) totassabs2009 Size (1) totassabs2008 
Size (2) Pearson Correlation 1 ,634
**
 ,709
**
 ,612
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  ,000 ,000 ,000 
N 59 59 59 59 
totassabs2009 Pearson Correlation ,634
**
 1 ,525
**
 ,994
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000  ,000 ,000 
N 59 59 59 59 
Size (1) Pearson Correlation ,709
**
 ,525
**
 1 ,533
**
 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000  ,000 
N 59 59 59 59 
totassabs2008 Pearson Correlation ,612
**
 ,994
**
 ,533
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000  
N 59 59 59 59 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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3 H1 a and b 
 
Correlations between independent variables for the survival models 
 Size (1) Age (1) Debt Equity 
Size (1) Pearson Correlation 1 .204 -.110 .272
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .093 .370 .027 
N 69 69 68 66 
Age (1) Pearson Correlation .204 1 -.071 -.125 
Sig. (2-tailed) .093  .568 .318 
N 69 69 68 66 
Debt Pearson Correlation -.110 -.071 1 .103 
Sig. (2-tailed) .370 .568  .413 
N 68 68 68 65 
Equity Pearson Correlation .272
*
 -.125 .103 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .318 .413  
N 66 66 65 66 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 
N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Skewness Kurtosis 
Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic Statistic 
Std. 
Error Statistic 
Std. 
Error 
Size 1 72 .00 12.31 6.6670 2.89453 -.945 .283 .833 .559 
Age 1 69 3.00 11.00 7.4348 2.04708 .149 .289 -.685 .570 
Debt 71 .00 4.00 .6901 .91950 1.345 .285 1.557 .563 
Equity  69 .00 4.00 2.1654 1.18358 -.621 .289 -.212 .570 
Valid N 
(listwise) 
65 
        
 
Base model (Cox Regression) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N Percent 
Cases available in analysis Event
a
 11 15.3% 
Censored 58 80.6% 
Total 69 95.8% 
Cases dropped Cases with missing values 3 4.2% 
Cases with negative time 0 .0% 
Censored cases before the earliest event in a stratum 0 .0% 
Total 3 4.2% 
Total 72 100.0% 
a. Dependent Variable: survival; time, (observation from 2008 until 01.03.2012)  
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
-2 Log Likelihood 
91.401 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
a
 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Overall (score) Change From Previous Step Change From Previous Block 
Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. 
78.347 15.520 2 .000 13.053 2 .001 13.053 2 .001 
a. Beginning Block Number 1. Method = Enter 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age (1) -.317 .175 3.288 1 .070 .729 
Size (1) -.299 .107 7.865 1 .005 .741 
 
Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients 
 Age (1) 
Size (1) -.250 
 
Covariate Means 
 Mean 
Age (1) 7.435 
Size (1) 6.957 
 
 APPENDIXES 
 
 
14 
 
Model 1 (Debt) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N Percent 
Cases available in analysis Event
a
 11 15.3% 
Censored 57 79.2% 
Total 68 94.4% 
Cases dropped Cases with missing values 4 5.6% 
Cases with negative time 0 .0% 
Censored cases before the earliest event in a stratum 0 .0% 
Total 4 5.6% 
Total 72 100.0% 
a. Dependent Variable: survival; time, (observation from 2008 until 01.03.2012) 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
-2 Log Likelihood 
91.052 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
a
 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Overall (score) Change From Previous Step Change From Previous Block 
Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. 
73.965 21.511 3 .000 17.087 3 .001 17.087 3 .001 
a. Beginning Block Number 1. Method = Enter 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age (1) -.344 .196 3.077 1 .079 .709 
Size (1) -.294 .109 7.328 1 .007 .745 
debt .494 .223 4.931 1 .026 1.639 
 
Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients 
 Age (1) Size (1) 
Size (1) -.178  
debt -.095 .042 
 
Covariate Means 
 Mean 
Age (1) 7.412 
Size (1) 6.955 
debt .676 
Model 2 (Equity) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N Percent 
Cases available in analysis Event
a
 11 15.3% 
Censored 55 76.4% 
Total 66 91.7% 
Cases dropped Cases with missing values 6 8.3% 
Cases with negative time 0 .0% 
Censored cases before the earliest event in a stratum 0 .0% 
Total 6 8.3% 
Total 72 100.0% 
a. Dependent Variable: survival; time, (observation from 2008 until 01.03.2012) 
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Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
-2 Log Likelihood 
90.338 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
a
 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Overall (score) Change From Previous Step Change From Previous Block 
Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. 
75.568 16.625 3 .001 14.771 3 .002 14.771 3 .002 
a. Beginning Block Number 1. Method = Enter 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age (1) -.410 .187 4.830 1 .028 .663 
Size (1) -.264 .109 5.903 1 .015 .768 
equity -.392 .242 2.623 1 .105 .676 
 
Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients 
 Age (1) Size (1) 
Size (1) -.167  
equity .365 -.190 
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Covariate Means 
 Mean 
Age (1) 7.303 
Size (1) 6.918 
equity 2.143 
 
 
Model 3 Full model (Debt+Equity) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N Percent 
Cases available in analysis Event
a
 11 15.3% 
Censored 54 75.0% 
Total 65 90.3% 
Cases dropped Cases with missing values 7 9.7% 
Cases with negative time 0 .0% 
Censored cases before the earliest event in a stratum 0 .0% 
Total 7 9.7% 
Total 72 100.0% 
a. Dependent Variable: survival; time, (observation from 2008 until 01.03.2012) 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
-2 Log Likelihood 
89.972 
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Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
a
 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Overall (score) Change From Previous Step Change From Previous Block 
Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. 
69.059 23.206 4 .000 20.913 4 .000 20.913 4 .000 
a. Beginning Block Number 1. Method = Enter 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Age (1) -.466 .207 5.054 1 .025 .627 
Size (1) -.263 .113 5.452 1 .020 .769 
debt .638 .230 7.671 1 .006 1.892 
equity -.632 .296 4.557 1 .033 .532 
 
 
Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients 
 Age (1) Size (1) debt 
Size (1) .005   
debt -.119 -.023  
equity .308 -.098 -.444 
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Covariate Means 
 Mean 
Age (1) 7.277 
Size (1) 6.916 
debt .662 
equity 2.137 
 
Model 4 Only independent variables (Debt+Equity) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
 N Percent 
Cases available in analysis Event
a
 11 15.3% 
Censored 54 75.0% 
Total 65 90.3% 
Cases dropped Cases with missing values 7 9.7% 
Cases with negative time 0 .0% 
Censored cases before the earliest event in a stratum 0 .0% 
Total 7 9.7% 
Total 72 100.0% 
a. Dependent Variable: survival; time, (observation from 2008 until 01.03.2012) 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
-2 Log Likelihood 
89.972 
 
 APPENDIXES 
 
 
20 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients
a
 
-2 Log 
Likelihood 
Overall (score) Change From Previous Step Change From Previous Block 
Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. Chi-square df Sig. 
80.154 11.032 2 .004 9.819 2 .007 9.819 2 .007 
a. Beginning Block Number 1. Method = Enter 
 
 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B SE Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
debt .724 .236 9.443 1 .002 2.063 
equity -.607 .287 4.484 1 .034 .545 
 
 
Correlation Matrix of Regression Coefficients 
 debt 
equity -.420 
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Covariate Means 
 Mean 
debt .662 
equity 2.137 
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Logistic regression (Robustness check) 
 
Case Processing Summary 
Unweighted Cases
a
 N Percent 
Selected Cases Included in Analysis 65 90,3 
Missing Cases 7 9,7 
Total 72 100,0 
Unselected Cases 0 ,0 
Total 72 100,0 
a. If weight is in effect, see classification table for the total number 
of cases. 
 
Dependent Variable Encoding 
Original Value Internal Value 
did not survive 0 
survived 1 
 
Block 0: Beginning Block 
 
Classification Table
a,b
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 survival 2012 Percentage 
Correct  did not survive survived 
Step 0 survival 2012 did not survive 0 11 ,0 
survived 0 54 100,0 
Overall Percentage   83,1 
a. Constant is included in the model. 
b. The cut value is ,500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 0 Constant 1,591 ,331 23,135 1 ,000 4,909 
 
 
Variables not in the Equation 
 Score df Sig. 
Step 0 Variables debt 7,502 1 ,006 
equity 2,080 1 ,149 
Overall Statistics 10,510 2 ,005 
 
 
Block 1: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 10,525 2 ,005 
Block 10,525 2 ,005 
Model 10,525 2 ,005 
 
Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 48,581
a
 ,149 ,250 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 5 because 
parameter estimates changed by less than ,001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
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Model Summary 
Step 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Cox & Snell R 
Square 
Nagelkerke R 
Square 
1 48,581
a
 ,149 ,250 
1 6,365 7 ,498 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
survival 2012; survival 2012 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 5 4,118 3 3,882 8 
2 1 1,538 5 4,462 6 
3 2 2,200 8 7,800 10 
4 2 1,144 5 5,856 7 
5 0 ,671 6 5,329 6 
6 0 ,630 9 8,370 9 
7 0 ,368 7 6,632 7 
8 1 ,214 5 5,786 6 
9 0 ,118 6 5,882 6 
 
Classification Table
a
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 survival 2012 Percentage 
Correct  did not survive survived 
Step 1 survival 2012 did not survive 2 9 18,2 
survived 1 53 98,1 
Overall Percentage   84,6 
a. The cut value is ,500 
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Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 debt -1,044 ,394 7,010 1 ,008 ,352 
equity ,661 ,340 3,774 1 ,052 1,936 
Constant 1,266 ,651 3,775 1 ,052 3,546 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: debt, equity. 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Constant          debt             equity 
Step 1 Constant          1,000 -,234 -,608 
debt             -,234 1,000 -,444 
equity -,608 -,444 1,000 
 
Block 2: Method = Enter 
 
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 4,810 1 ,028 
Block 4,810 1 ,028 
Model 15,335 3 ,002 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 43,771
a
 ,210 ,352 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than ,001. 
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Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 10,587 7 ,158 
 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
survival 2012 survival 2012 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 6 4,514 1 2,486 7 
2 0 2,269 8 5,731 8 
3 1 1,675 7 6,325 8 
4 2 ,951 5 6,049 7 
5 2 ,623 5 6,377 7 
6 0 ,460 7 6,540 7 
7 0 ,278 7 6,722 7 
8 0 ,161 7 6,839 7 
9 0 ,070 7 6,930 7 
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Classification Table
a
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 survival 2012 Percentage 
Correct  did not survive survived 
Step 1 survival 2012 did not survive 5 6 45,5 
survived 1 53 98,1 
Overall Percentage   89,2 
a. The cut value is ,500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 debt -1,061 ,419 6,410 1 ,011 ,346 
equity ,757 ,359 4,436 1 ,035 2,131 
Age (1) ,461 ,234 3,876 1 ,049 1,586 
Constant -2,071 1,758 1,388 1 ,239 ,126 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Age (1). 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Constant          debt             equity Age (1)         
Step 1 Constant          1,000 ,035 -,434 -,918 
debt             ,035 1,000 -,444 -,131 
equity -,434 -,444 1,000 ,205 
Age (1)         -,918 -,131 ,205 1,000 
 
Block 3: Method = Enter 
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Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients 
 Chi-square df Sig. 
Step 1 Step 1,073 1 ,300 
Block 1,073 1 ,300 
Model 16,408 4 ,003 
 
Model Summary 
Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square 
1 42,698
a
 ,223 ,374 
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates 
changed by less than ,001. 
 
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
Step Chi-square df Sig. 
1 11,070 7 ,136 
 
Contingency Table for Hosmer and Lemeshow Test 
 
survival 2012 survival 2012 
Total Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Step 1 1 5 4,772 2 2,228 7 
2 1 2,031 6 4,969 7 
3 1 1,404 6 5,596 7 
4 1 ,964 6 6,036 7 
5 3 ,672 4 6,328 7 
6 0 ,500 7 6,500 7 
7 0 ,336 7 6,664 7 
8 0 ,220 7 6,780 7 
9 0 ,102 9 8,898 9 
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Classification Table
a
 
 
Observed 
Predicted 
 survival 2012 Percentage 
Correct  did not survive survived 
Step 1 survival 2012 did not survive 5 6 45,5 
survived 1 53 98,1 
Overall Percentage   89,2 
a. The cut value is ,500 
 
Variables in the Equation 
 B S.E. Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
Step 1
a
 debt -,963 ,416 5,348 1 ,021 ,382 
equity ,603 ,378 2,544 1 ,111 1,828 
Age (1) ,423 ,242 3,066 1 ,080 1,527 
Size (1) ,146 ,141 1,071 1 ,301 1,157 
Constant -2,547 1,860 1,875 1 ,171 ,078 
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: Size (1). 
 
 
Correlation Matrix 
 Constant          debt             equity Age (1)         Size (1)      
Step 1 Constant          1,000 ,000 -,346 -,846 -,241 
debt             ,000 1,000 -,427 -,153 ,151 
equity -,346 -,427 1,000 ,270 -,341 
Age (1)         -,846 -,153 ,270 1,000 -,149 
Size (1)      -,241 ,151 -,341 -,149 1,000 
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4 H2 a and b 
 
Appendix Correlations between variables for the models of growth, models (5,6,7,8) 
 Ln(Growth absolute) Ln(Growth relative) Size (2) Age (2)  Debt  Equity  
Ln(Growth 
absolute) 
Pearson Correlation 1      
Sig. (2-tailed)       
N 59      
Ln(Growth 
relative) 
Pearson Correlation ,276
*
 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) ,034      
N 59 59     
Size (2) Pearson Correlation ,258
*
 ,084 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) ,049 ,529     
N 59 59 59    
Age (2) Pearson Correlation -,044 -,053 ,039 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,743 ,693 ,769    
N 59 59 59 59   
Debt  Pearson Correlation ,063 ,203 -,046 -,057 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,638 ,127 ,729 ,672   
N 58 58 58 58 58  
Equity  Pearson Correlation ,026 ,132 ,129 -,258 ,129 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,849 ,330 ,343 ,055 ,348  
N 56 56 56 56 55 56 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Base model Regression 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Size (2), Age (2) . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 ,263
a
 ,069 ,036 ,24442 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), Age (2) 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression ,249 2 ,124 2,082 ,134
a
 
Residual 3,345 56 ,060   
Total 3,594 58    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), Age (2) 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 8,971 ,173  52,004 ,000      
Age (2) -,007 ,016 -,054 -,417 ,679 -,044 -,056 -,054 ,998 1,002 
Size (2) ,039 ,019 ,260 2,012 ,049 ,258 ,260 ,259 ,998 1,002 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Coefficient Correlations
a
 
Model Size (2) Age (2) 
1 Correlations Size (2) 1,000 -,039 
Age (2) -,039 1,000 
Covariances Size (2) ,000 -1,217E-5 
Age (2) -1,217E-5 ,000 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Age (2) Size (2) 
1 1 2,898 1,000 ,00 ,01 ,01 
2 ,081 5,981 ,03 ,87 ,16 
3 ,021 11,811 ,97 ,12 ,84 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Model (5) Debt  
 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered 
Variables 
Removed Method 
1 Debt, Size (2), Age (2) . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,274
a
 ,075 ,024 ,24813 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Debt, Size (2), Age (2) 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression ,269 3 ,090 1,458 ,236
a
 
Residual 3,325 54 ,062   
Total 3,594 57    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Debt, Size (2), Age (2) 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 8,952 ,178  50,181 ,000   
Size (2) ,039 ,020 ,264 2,012 ,049 ,996 1,004 
Age (2) -,006 ,016 -,052 -,394 ,695 ,995 1,005 
Debt ,021 ,037 ,072 ,552 ,584 ,995 1,005 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Size (2) Age (2) Debt 
1 1 3,275 1,000 ,00 ,00 ,01 ,03 
2 ,623 2,293 ,00 ,00 ,01 ,94 
3 ,081 6,350 ,03 ,16 ,86 ,01 
4 ,021 12,585 ,97 ,83 ,12 ,02 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Model (6) Equity  
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Equity, Size (2), Age (2) . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 ,309
a
 ,095 ,043 ,22623 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Equity, Size (2), Age (2) 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression ,280 3 ,093 1,826 ,154
a
 
Residual 2,661 52 ,051   
Total 2,942 55    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Equity, Size (2), Age (2) 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 8,919 ,174  51,279 ,000   
Size (2) ,042 ,018 ,309 2,312 ,025 ,977 1,023 
Age (2) ,002 ,016 ,016 ,120 ,905 ,928 1,078 
Equity -,002 ,027 -,010 -,070 ,944 ,914 1,094 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Size (2) Age (2) Equity 
1 1 3,712 1,000 ,00 ,00 ,01 ,01 
2 ,206 4,247 ,00 ,00 ,15 ,61 
3 ,062 7,769 ,03 ,32 ,65 ,32 
4 ,021 13,434 ,96 ,67 ,19 ,06 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Model 7 full 
 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Size (2), Debt, Age (2), Equity . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .332
a
 .110 .039 .22880 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), Debt, Age (2), Equity 
 
 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .324 4 .081 1.549 .203
a
 
Residual 2.617 50 .052   
Total 2.942 54    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), Debt, Age (2), Equity 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 8.895 .178  50.003 .000      
Debt .032 .035 .123 .912 .366 .103 .128 .122 .976 1.025 
Equity -.005 .028 -.025 -.179 .858 .026 -.025 -.024 .898 1.113 
Age (2) .003 .017 .023 .164 .871 .033 .023 .022 .920 1.086 
Size (2) .043 .018 .316 2.336 .024 .308 .314 .312 .972 1.029 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue 
Condition 
Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Debt Equity Age (2) Size (2) 
1 1 4.052 1.000 .00 .02 .01 .01 .00 
2 .659 2.479 .00 .94 .00 .01 .00 
3 .206 4.434 .00 .03 .62 .14 .00 
4 .062 8.106 .03 .00 .31 .65 .33 
5 .021 14.028 .96 .02 .05 .19 .67 
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Model (8) Independent variables 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Equity, Debt . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .104
a
 .011 -.027 .23656 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Equity, Debt 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .032 2 .016 .283 .754
a
 
Residual 2.910 52 .056   
Total 2.942 54    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Equity, Debt 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9.223 .070  130.873 .000      
Debt .026 .036 .101 .729 .470 .103 .101 .100 .983 1.017 
Equity .003 .028 .013 .094 .926 .026 .013 .013 .983 1.017 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) Debt Equity 
1 1 2.316 1.000 .03 .07 .03 
2 .573 2.011 .04 .92 .05 
3 .112 4.549 .92 .00 .92 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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5 H3 Influence of VC on growth in sales 
 
Correlations 
 Ln(Growth absolute) Ln(Growth relative) Size (2) Age (2) Debt VC 
Ln(Growth 
absolute) 
Pearson Correlation 1      
Sig. (2-tailed)       
N 59      
Ln(Growth 
relative) 
Pearson Correlation ,276
*
 1     
Sig. (2-tailed) ,034      
N 59 59     
Size (2) Pearson Correlation ,258
*
 ,084 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) ,049 ,529     
N 59 59 59    
Age (2) Pearson Correlation -,044 -,053 ,039 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) ,743 ,693 ,769    
N 59 59 59 59   
Debt Pearson Correlation ,063 ,203 -,046 -,057 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) ,638 ,127 ,729 ,672   
N 58 58 58 58 58  
VC Pearson Correlation ,390
**
 ,227 ,283
*
 -,126 ,268
*
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) ,002 ,083 ,030 ,342 ,042  
N 59 59 59 59 58 59 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Model 9  
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Age (2), Size (2), VC . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .419
a
 .176 .131 .23206 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age (2), Size (2), VC 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .632 3 .211 3.914 .013
a
 
Residual 2.962 55 .054   
Total 3.594 58    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age (2), Size (2), VC b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9.011 .164  54.792 .000      
VC .062 .023 .344 2.669 .010 .390 .339 .327 .901 1.110 
Size (2) .024 .019 .160 1.253 .216 .258 .167 .153 .914 1.094 
Age (2) -.001 .015 -.007 -.053 .958 -.044 -.007 -.006 .978 1.022 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) VC Size (2) Age (2) 
1 1 3.144 1.000 .00 .02 .00 .01 
2 .761 2.033 .00 .86 .00 .01 
3 .075 6.484 .04 .08 .15 .89 
4 .020 12.494 .95 .03 .85 .09 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model 10  
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Size (2), VC . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .419
a
 .176 .146 .22998 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), VC 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .632 2 .316 5.976 .004
a
 
Residual 2.962 56 .053   
Total 3.594 58    
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Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Size (2), VC . Enter 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), VC 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9.007 .143  62.878 .000      
VC .062 .023 .345 2.729 .008 .390 .343 .331 .920 1.087 
Size (2) .024 .019 .160 1.264 .212 .258 .167 .153 .920 1.087 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) VC Size (2) 
1 1 2.287 1.000 .01 .06 .01 
2 .691 1.819 .01 .88 .00 
3 .022 10.301 .99 .06 .99 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Model 11 Regression (Full model) 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Age (2), Size (2), Debt, VC . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered. 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .421
a
 .178 .116 .23615 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age (2), Size (2), Debt, VC 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .639 4 .160 2.863 .032
a
 
Residual 2.956 53 .056   
Total 3.594 57    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Age (2), Size (2), Debt, VC 
b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9.017 .172  52.535 .000      
VC .063 .025 .352 2.573 .013 .391 .333 .320 .828 1.207 
Debt -.007 .037 -.024 -.187 .853 .063 -.026 -.023 .912 1.096 
Size (2) .024 .020 .159 1.208 .232 .258 .164 .150 .900 1.112 
Age (2) -.001 .016 -.010 -.079 .938 -.044 -.011 -.010 .978 1.022 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) VC Debt Size (2) Age (2) 
1 1 3.555 1.000 .00 .02 .02 .00 .01 
2 .810 2.095 .00 .51 .13 .00 .01 
3 .540 2.567 .00 .35 .81 .00 .00 
4 .076 6.847 .04 .07 .00 .14 .89 
5 .020 13.439 .95 .05 .04 .85 .08 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Model 12 Regression (VC, Debt, Size(2)) 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Size (2), Debt, VC . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered.   b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .421
a
 .178 .132 .23396 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), Debt, VC 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .638 3 .213 3.886 .014
a
 
Residual 2.956 54 .055   
Total 3.594 57    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Size (2), Debt, VC   b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations Collinearity Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9.011 .151  59.846 .000      
VC .064 .024 .354 2.629 .011 .391 .337 .324 .842 1.187 
Debt -.007 .037 -.024 -.187 .852 .063 -.025 -.023 .912 1.096 
Size (2) .024 .019 .158 1.217 .229 .258 .163 .150 .905 1.105 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Model 13 Regression (VC and Debt on growth) 
 
Variables Entered/Removed
b
 
Model Variables Entered Variables Removed Method 
1 Debt, VC . Enter 
a. All requested variables entered.    b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
Std. Error of the 
Estimate 
1 .394
a
 .155 .124 .23498 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Debt, VC 
 
ANOVA
b
 
Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression .557 2 .279 5.045 .010
a
 
Residual 3.037 55 .055   
Total 3.594 57    
a. Predictors: (Constant), Debt, VC   b. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
Coefficients
a
 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
Correlations 
Collinearity 
Statistics 
B Std. Error Beta Zero-order Partial Part Tolerance VIF 
1 (Constant) 9.188 .038  239.564 .000      
VC .073 .023 .403 3.136 .003 .391 .389 .389 .928 1.077 
Debt -.013 .037 -.045 -.349 .729 .063 -.047 -.043 .928 1.077 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
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Collinearity Diagnostics
a
 
Model Dimension Eigenvalue Condition Index 
Variance Proportions 
(Constant) VC Debt 
1 1 1.953 1.000 .12 .11 .12 
2 .606 1.796 .18 .88 .13 
3 .442 2.103 .70 .00 .75 
a. Dependent Variable: Ln(Growth absolute) 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
Hvilken kommersialiseringsaktør (KA) er du tilknyttet, eller har du vært tilknyttet? Kryss av for den aktøren som har vært 
viktigst. * survival 2012 Crosstabulation (Count) 
 
 
survival 2012 
Total did not survive survived 
Hvilken kommersialiseringsaktør  
(KA) er du tilknyttet, eller har du 
vært tilknyttet? Kryss av for den 
aktøren som har vært viktigst. 
0 0 2 2 
Bergen teknologioverføring 0 2 2 
Bioparken 0 2 2 
Birkeland innovasjon 1 5 6 
Campus Kjeller 2 10 12 
Coventure (Sørlandet Teknologisenter) 1 4 5 
Forskningsparken AS 0 3 3 
Leiv Eirikson Nyskaping 1 7 8 
Norinnova & TTO Nord 4 4 8 
NTNU technology transfer 1 8 9 
Prekubator 1 4 5 
Sinvent 0 2 2 
Forinnova 0 3 3 
Biomedisinsk Innovasjon 0 2 2 
Total 11 58 69 
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Age (1) * survival 2012 Crosstabulation 
 
 
survival 2012 
Total did not survive survived 
Age (1) 3.00 1 0 1 
4.00 2 2 4 
5.00 1 5 6 
6.00 1 12 13 
7.00 2 13 15 
8.00 4 6 10 
9.00 0 6 6 
10.00 0 7 7 
11.00 0 7 7 
Total 11 58 69 
 
